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Articles 
FROTHY CHAOS:  MODERN DATA 
WAREHOUSING AND OLD-FASHIONED 
DEFAMATION 
Elizabeth D. De Armond* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every individual is unique.  Each of us has a unique set of facts that 
positively distinguishes us from everyone else in the world.1  Even 
identical twins develop a different history, a different biography of 
events, over the course of time.  Among these events are our transactions 
in commerce—the accounts we open, the items we buy, the bills we pay, 
the services we obtain, the charges we make.  All of these events can now 
be, and often are, recorded digitally so that they can easily be duplicated, 
searched, and transmitted to others.  These advances in information 
technology have not only benefited traditional entities that aggregate 
personal information, such as credit reporting agencies, but new 
aggregators who collect all sorts of information about individuals and 
warehouse it in databases, and “data miners” who analyze and assemble 
disparate bits of information about individuals to assemble profiles of 
behavior.   
In the midst of all this personal information churns a wealth of false 
information, transactions linked to the wrong actor.  Some of the 
misattribution arises from identity theft, allowing impostors to pose as 
their victims to gain goods and services.  However, the detachment of 
individuals from their data raises the real risk that one person’s deed 
will be mismatched to another person’s identity, even when no thief has 
sought to intentionally misdirect information.  Our failure to take care to 
match events with identities has led to a “frothy Chaos” of 
misinformation and mismatched transactions.2  Furthermore, the power 
of mismatched information, especially about financial transactions, to 
disrupt or even paralyze, the lives of individuals has grown 
dramatically.  Important decisions are made based on rumor rather than 
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Legal Research and Writing, Chicago-Kent College of 
Law.  I would like to thank Kristen Osenga and participants at a faculty workshop at 
Chicago-Kent for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
1 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF A SPOILED IDENTITY 57 
(1963). 
2 Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, Of Glory, in ESSAYS 565 (John Florio trans., 1904). 
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fact—defamation of a most damaging sort, damaging to reputation, 
damaging to personality, and damaging to dignity.   
Nonetheless, the power of law to curb the creation of these flawed 
links has not kept up with information technology and its use.  The main 
legal scheme that regulates the aggregation and reporting of personal 
financial information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), has failed 
to maintain the integrity of that information, leading to too many 
individuals suffering from a false reputation tainted by the acts of 
others.3 
However, the information age has not just given us the power to 
record, store, and disseminate data; it allows us to use computers to 
analyze, cross-check, and verify data more easily.  These tools can 
identify inaccurately-attributed information and keep it out of the data 
sea.  The age old tort of defamation, when viewed in light of these new 
processes, can allow realistic relief that may motivate data aggregators to 
treat individual records and personal identifying information much 
more carefully. 
In Shakespeare’s King Richard II, loyal Thomas Mowbray alludes to 
the distinction between a “spotless reputation” and the body that it is 
connected to.4  We may not all have spotless reputations, but we are at 
least entitled to the reputation deserved by our own deeds rather than 
the deeds of someone else.  The answer to the problem of misinformation 
about individuals lies not in retreating from technology, but in 
embracing it. 
This Article examines the particular problem of data inaccuracies 
caused by or aggravated by information technology, the impact such 
data can have on consumers, and the opportunity for the traditional tort 
of defamation to redress that impact.  Part II of this Article describes how 
                                                 
3 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2000) [hereinafter FCRA]. 
4 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD II act 1, scene 1 (3d ed. 2000).  
The full quotation is as follows: 
The purest treasure mortal times afford 
Is spotless reputation.  That away, 
Men are but gilded loam or painted clay. 
A jewel in a ten-times-barred-up chest 
Is a bold spirit in a loyal breast. 
Mine honor is my life, both grow in one; 
Take honor from me, and my life is done. 
Then, dear my liege, mine honour let me try; 
In that I live and for that will I die. 
Id. 
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individuals’ transactional identities develop through the aggregation of 
individual events and identifies the entities that provide, collect, and 
analyze those records.  It then discusses the problem of false data, 
especially false financial data, and explains how current information 
practices have increased the power of such dirty data over the dignity 
and personhood of individuals.  Part III describes the FCRA, the existing 
legal structure that should protect individuals from the impact of such 
bad data, and how it has failed.  Part IV identifies how the common law 
tort of defamation can be brought up to date to appropriately balance the 
rights and needs of individuals to bear an accurate reputation and the 
power of data warehousers and miners over the vast databases they 
tend. 
II.  THE PROBLEM 
A. Biography and Image:  The Construction of Our Transactional Identity 
John Locke once described the identity of any one person as 
consisting of “nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by 
constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the 
same organized Body.”5  Throughout our continued lives, we participate 
in any number of events and transactions, performing all sorts of deeds.  
Many of these are transactions where we exchange money or the 
promise to pay money for goods and services or, in the case of charity, 
for some higher return.  For any one person, a full biography of these 
transactions with others will distinguish that individual from every 
other.6   
Once, these transactions would have remained inseparable from the 
parties who made them.  In a local economy, a merchant would have 
known his customers and a banker would have known his borrowers, by 
name and by face.  Reputations would have been built from these face-
to-face transactions.  Many transactions would have left no physical 
record behind, but when Locke wrote these words in 1690 some might 
have been memorialized on paper—a loan in a ledger, a sale on a receipt.  
Although a particular individual would know of his own biography of 
transactions, any third party could compile that list only by going from 
store to store and bank to bank to painstakingly draw it up. 
                                                 
5 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. 27, § 6, at 
331-32 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690). 
6 See GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 56 (describing the full set of facts known about someone 
as a complex that positively identifies that individual). 
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Because of the localized economy and in-person transactions, the 
chances of ascribing a particular deed to the wrongdoer were likely 
slight; should such an error have occurred, likely the consequences 
would have been circumscribed to one event and the error easily undone 
with a few strokes of a pen, at least so long as the one making the error 
did not specifically seek to defame the customer.7  One’s reputation may 
not have been wholly free from calumny and slander, but generally the 
false words would have come from someone local, who was known, who 
could be corrected or perhaps exposed.8  Because the transactions were 
local, individuals had control over their reputations. 
Now, however, instead of transacting with someone across a 
counter, we transact with someone across the country, or even across 
several continents.9  Transactions are much more likely to be electronic 
and to be memorialized electronically, not just inscribed in a book.  
Transactions that once would have required a consumer to physically 
put pen to paper to sign off on an exchange can now be achieved 
without pen or paper.10  We are far more likely now than a few decades 
ago to borrow from or spend money with an entity that never sees us.  In 
fact, many details of a transaction might never fall in front of a pair of 
human eyes.  For example, a lender’s computer may automatically debit 
a borrower’s bank account for the amount due monthly on a mortgage.  
The funds may be subtracted from the borrower’s account and added to 
the lender’s without any human intervention at all.11  Even when a 
transaction does involve an interpersonal transaction, such as when a 
department store clerk opens a charge card account for a customer at a 
store counter, the details of the event will be recorded and stored in 
electronic form and only incidentally on paper.  The rise in this sort of 
                                                 
7 R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REV. 99, 100-03.  The defamation 
cases among the local cases in the English middle ages typically concerned personal insults.  
Id. 
8 See generally KENNETH GROSS, SHAKESPEARE’S NOISE (2001) (discussing themes of 
slander, rumor, and gossip in Hamlet, Measure for Measure, King Lear, and Coriolanus).  
Though written a bit earlier than Locke’s works, many of Shakespeare’s plays explored, as 
part of the study of the characters, their reaction to slander from familiar sources.  Id. 
9 Cf. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 314 (2000). 
10 See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-
7021 (2000); The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 7 (draft 1999), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecicta/eta1299.htm.  Such electronic signatures can 
authenticate a transaction much as a written one can.  Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 
supra. 
11 Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (2000).  Such a transaction is 
called a “preauthorized electronic fund transfer” and is generally governed by the 
Electronic Funds Transfer Act.  Id. 
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electronic, detached commerce has led to a variety of federal laws to 
regulate it, including the Electronic Funds Transfer Act,12 the Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,13 and the Check 
Clearing for the 21st Century Act.14 
This change in the form of commerce has correspondingly changed 
the construction of each person’s transactional identity, the image from 
which an individual’s reputation flows.  Through one’s actions, one 
relates to others and makes impressions on them.  These impressions, 
taken as a whole, constitute an individual’s reputation—that is, what 
other people think of you, to the extent that their thoughts arise from 
what they know about you, or think they know about you.15  As Steven 
Heyman writes, “While reputation belongs to the self, in another sense it 
is external to the self, existing within the minds of others.”16  Thus, our 
reputation for worthiness to participate in transactions depends on our 
transactions, the image that those transactions portray, and how others 
view that image. 
The biography of our transactions is not fixed; it changes with each 
transaction, each transaction augmenting a person’s history, adding to it 
like a flake of snow onto a snowball, compiling what Erving Goffman 
referred to as “a single continuous record of social facts” that stick to our 
identity.17  A single day in a typical modern consumer’s life could yield 
the information that such a consumer bought a cup of coffee and a 
newspaper, ate lunch out, purchased two books that were on the New 
York Times bestseller list, refilled a prescription, paid a gas bill, all added 
to the data sea.  Each day, more and more such transactions will stick to 
                                                 
12 Id. §§ 1693-1693r. 
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7021 (2000). 
14 12 U.S.C. § 5001 (Supp. III 2003) (allowing banks to substitute an electronic image of a 
check for the paper item through the electronic process).  See generally BENJAMIN GEVA, THE 
LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFERS (2002). 
15 See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2556 
(1993) (listing as one definition of “reputation”: “[t]he general opinion or estimate of a 
person’s character, behaviour, etc.; the relative esteem in which a person or thing is held”); 
Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal 
History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2002). 
16 Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of 
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1325 (1998).  “In this way, [according to 
Heyman,] reputation resembles the right to property, which is also external to the 
individual.”  Id.; see also Montaigne, supra note 2, at 560 (“There is both name, and the 
thing: the name, is a voice which noteth, and signifieth the thing: the name, is neither part 
of thing nor of substance: it is a stranger-piece joyned to the thing, and from it.”). 
17 GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 57. 
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that individual’s identity and adjust the existing image that the 
biography portrays. 
In pointed contrast, our identifying markers are relatively fixed.  
Some types of identifying information—one’s date of birth, place of 
birth, and mother’s maiden name, for example—never change.18  Social 
security numbers and gender have similar staying power for the vast 
majority of us.19  Other forms of identifying information, such as address 
and telephone number, may change from time to time, more for some 
than for others, but generally remain stable for at least some period.  
When a financial event becomes recorded electronically, markers 
that purport to identify a flesh and blood individual are recorded with it.  
This identifying information in an electronic record can be thought of as 
“header” information.20  Biographies can be formed by amassing the 
scattered and strewn records that have matching header information.  
So, for example, a restaurant may record the items a customer ordered 
and the amount paid (including tip), tag it with header information 
consisting of the customer’s name, and charge the account number.  The 
record can then be pooled with other transactions bearing those markers.  
Similarly, a pharmacist can record the medicine, dosage, and prescribing 
doctor of a prescription and pair it with the customer’s name, date-of-
birth, and insurance information. 
All of the records that bear the identity tags of a specific individual 
give rise to a transactional identity, what Daniel Solove calls a “digital 
dossier.”21  The collection of transactional identities creates a parallel 
universe of sorts, one inhabited by virtual individuals who comprise not 
Locke’s “fleeting Particles of Matter,” but rather permanent particles of 
data.  This virtual person portrays its own digital reputation.22  From the 
                                                 
18 Concededly, one may be mistaken about such information, and new information may 
then change the marker. 
19 See The Official Website of the U.S. Social Security Administration, www.ssa.gov (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2007).  The Social Security Administration will issue a new social security 
number only under very limited circumstances.  Id. 
20 See Individual Reference Servs. Group, Inc. v. F.T.C., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 17 (D.D.C. 
2001) (describing “‘credit header’” information as “the name, address, social security 
number, and telephone number of a consumer”). 
21 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 1 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON]. 
22 Cf. Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the 
Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1165, 1170-72 (2001) (arguing that 
“imaginary virtual humans,” digital clones of living individuals, are entitled to protection 
from defamation, invasion of privacy, and commercial misassociation with products and 
services). 
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perspective of those who observe any one virtual person, whether to 
evaluate the person as a credit risk, an insurance or employment 
prospect, or someone with money to spend, the person may be no more 
than the particular fragments of information that interest them.  The self 
is presented not as a unified whole, but as facets of database records.23 
B. The Impact of Data Technology 
Records of information about individuals and their transactions are 
not new.  We have been able to track transactions since the agrarian 
society of the Sumerians developed Cuneiform,24 and used it for, among 
other purposes, memorializing debts for barley on wet clay tablets.25  The 
aggregation of transactional records is not a modern development either.  
Comprehensive records began to be kept to serve the needs of evolving 
societies in the beginning of the last millennium.  For example, William 
the Conqueror commissioned the Domesday Book in 1086 to identify the 
ownership of all land, buildings, livestock, and other resources for the 
purpose of assessing taxes.26 
But since those times, we have developed far more useful systems 
for recording individuals’ transactions.  A clay tablet is not duplicated 
easily, is somewhat cumbersome to carry around, and would likely be 
viewed by only a few people—perhaps only the original parties to the 
exchange.  These factors constrained the power of the information on the 
tablet.  Even access to the Domesday Book would have been limited to 
those with the position to gain an audience with it. 
                                                 
23 Cf. Richard Warner, Surveillance & the Self: Privacy, Identity, and Technology, 54 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 847, 854-55 (2005) (describing how one’s identity encompasses different social roles 
for different purposes). 
24 STEVEN ROGER FISHER, A HISTORY OF WRITING 26-27 (2004). 
25 Science Museum of Minnesota, http://www.smm.org/research/Anthropology/ 
cuneiform/cuneiform.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (museum cuneiform collection 
containing such tablets).  Later, another agrarian society, the Incas, used knot records to 
record mercantile transactions.  FISHER, supra note 24, at 14.  The record system was known 
as quipu and continued after the Spanish conquest.  Id. at 15.  The system counted potatoes, 
sheep, and grains.  Id. 
26 See SIR HENRY ELLIS, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO DOMESDAY BOOK: OFFICIAL COPY FOR 
THE USE OF HIS MAJESTY’S COMMISSIONERS ON THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE KINGDOM 177 
(1817).  The new idea of compiled, permanent records led twelfth-century Christians to call 
the work the “Domesday Book,” comparing it to the Last Judgment, or Doomsday, 
described in the Bible, when the deeds of Christians written in the Book of Life were to be 
placed before God for judgment.  See Revelations 20:12, 20:15. 
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1. The Accessibility and Power of Data 
As more of our deeds are inscribed in bytes rather than on paper, 
more information about us is more available and accessible than ever 
before.  Information about individuals, from their debts to their DNA, 
can now be stored digitally, allowing others to duplicate, download, 
upload, e-mail, search, and even print the information—albeit far more 
likely onto paper than onto clay.  Others can also compare and contrast 
information quickly and easily with other information and, with just a 
few key strokes, search the data for any string of characters. 
As discussed above, all of this information about any one 
individual’s transactions becomes a financial “digital dossier” that has 
replaced a locally made and personally observed reputation.27  Now, our 
reputations are perceived by many observers almost entirely from bits of 
data over which we have practically no control.  Creditors, landlords, 
utility companies, mortgagees, and even employers may condition 
services on the basis of information in an individual’s credit report—the 
commercially available representation of a reputation—and can use that 
information to change the terms of a deal, or even to refuse to participate 
at all.  A data entry thousands of miles away, created from a transaction 
that never involved a face, may be the single most significant piece of 
information to a potential creditor, employer, or government official.   
It is not just the records of private sector entities, such as banks, 
businesses, and doctors, that have become digitized; public records are 
far more accessible as well.  Once, to comprehensively learn someone’s 
criminal history a researcher would have had to go to each courthouse in 
each jurisdiction where the target may have been and research through 
the public records.  The information may have been public, but the pains 
required to search through it rendered much of it functionally invisible.  
However, more and more public entities record information 
electronically and make it available.  For example, many states post 
online lists of sexual predators pursuant to “Megan’s laws.”28  Similarly, 
many public records formerly buried in clerk’s offices are now available 
via the Internet, removing the effort barrier and revealing what once 
would have been, for practical purposes, hidden from most.29 
                                                 
27 SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 21, at 1. 
28 See Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan’s Laws, 
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355 (2005) (listing the sex offender registry laws of all fifty states). 
29 See, e.g., Cook County Recorder of Deeds, http://www.ccrd.info/CCRD/il031/ 
index.jsp (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (property records of Cook County, Illinois).  For 
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Public or private, much information about individuals is but 
keystrokes away from appearing on any computer screen in the world.  
Accordingly, information about an individual can be viewed by more 
people and more easily than can the account books of the last century.30  
Our reputations have become, as Steven Nock terms, “portable.”31  That 
portability has changed the power of the information. 
Data in electronic form is not just much more accessible, it is also 
much more easily duplicated.  One need not laboriously copy, character 
by character, information onto a new clay tablet, need not transcribe it, 
key by key, onto a separate sheet of paper, and need not even spin the 
drum of a mimeograph machine.  Rather, now we can hit “control-c” and 
“control-v” or click “save as,” and store a fresh and complete copy of the 
information in our own files.  We can then upload that file to the 
Internet, making it available for one, dozens, hundreds, thousands, to 
likewise copy and save.  Although photocopy machines also eased 
duplication, digital duplication allows us to send the information out in 
an e-mail to any number of others.  Information that once was tied down, 
by simple physicality, to a point certain in space, can now live in a near 
infinite number of places. 
Not only is digital information on the Internet far easier to access 
and duplicate than print information (or clay tablets), that access and 
duplicatability give it more stamina than its print cousin.  Pieces of paper 
yellow, curl, and eventually disintegrate, and, unless catalogued with 
librarian-like precision, are highly likely to get lost or buried before 
reaching such ends.  But even if many hard drives suddenly fail, an item 
of electronic information may well have been sufficiently copied to allow 
the substance to survive somewhere.  Even data that a user tries to 
destroy often remains available to a savvy searcher. 
Digital information’s searchability also increases its power.  Because 
the information resides in bytes, it sifts easily through a custom-made 
strainer constructed with “control-f” or a similar tool.  In contrast, no 
control-f exists to help us find things in real space.  Without the ability to 
have a computer search for that piece of information, the chances of 
recalling the data are far lower.  Just as keeping records in the musty files 
                                                                                                             
example, many taxing authorities have put property records online that list, for each parcel, 
that parcel’s owner, the assessed value, and any interests that burden the property, such as 
mortgages, liens, and deeds.  Id. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 31-36. 
31 STEVEN L. NOCK, COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN AMERICA 3 
(1993). 
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of a courthouse archive room renders most of the data held within 
functionally invisible, material in homes, businesses, and other locales, 
even if exactingly indexed, will lose accessibility and with that, its power 
to impact future transactions. 
Not only can a human easily search digitized data, but so can 
machines, far more quickly and thoroughly.  Once programmed with a 
particular algorithm, a powerful computer can examine in seconds what 
once would have taken legions of clerks to page through.  Many 
consumers do not realize that when they apply for credit, no one at the 
creditor’s office may ever read the consumer’s credit history.  Rather, a 
computer will pull and examine a credit score, a number produced from 
that credit history through some sort of algorithm that assigns different 
weights to different types of data.32  Thus, the information’s power can 
be disconnected from the data itself, transformed via machine and 
algorithm into a three-digit representation of a person. 
The effects of electronic storage of records and advances in database 
technology extend beyond increased access to and searchability of the 
information.  The uniformity of the medium has increased the power of 
information because digitizing it pancakes time.  Information from ten 
years ago might well appear just as fresh as information from yesterday.  
The associated aspects of aged information that might have cued us to 
draw less significance from it—the yellowing newspaper, the faded 
print, the curled and frayed edges of a long-stored document, the noir 
appearance of a microfiche—impacted our perception of the value of the 
information contained within it, and may well have led us to attribute 
less significance to the contents than we once would.  However, these 
associated aspects have, in many cases, been stripped away from the 
content.  Now, aged information may well present itself on our computer 
screen as being no older than, no less reliable than, no less interesting 
than, information dated today.  We have to rely on the associated date, 
not other cues, to note its freshness.  Thus, older information has more 
vigor than it once might have; therefore, we react to it differently and we 
give it more credence than we might have in the past.  In this way, an 
electronic description of a past deed can have a much longer half-life 
than a physical record of the same event. 
Additional power arises from the tremendous interest that 
information of the events in our lives has for those with whom we do, or 
would like to do, business, and for those who would like to do business 
                                                 
32 See infra text accompanying notes 37-59. 
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with us.  In the first category are those who seek to establish our merit 
for a specific transaction or relationship, for example, to provide us 
insurance, to employ us, or to extend us credit.33  In the second are those 
who seek to identify us to target us for a sales pitch—direct marketers 
and politicians, for instance.34  Both types assess an individual’s 
information to determine that individual’s worthiness—that is, that 
individual’s reputation—generated from the individual data items.  The 
appetite of these actors for our transactional information, the biography 
of those facts deemed relevant by others and that distinguishes us from 
other consumers, has grown with the ability to store those facts 
electronically.35 
In light of their accessibility and vigor, these “digital dossiers” raise 
privacy concerns, even when they faithfully represent the deeds of the 
individual to which they are linked, because they impair our control 
over the image that we project to the world.  In this conception of 
privacy, we have a right to a certain amount of control over the image, 
the face, we present to the world.36  However, the point of this Article is 
not to address that duplication and distribution, the ease of access to 
information, as it impacts the sense of our vulnerability to true 
information.  Rather, this Article argues that those attributions of 
information all magnify the importance of truth, and that importance 
justifies protecting individuals from bearing the burden of digital 
reputations poisoned by dirty data.  The rate of errors and 
misinformation in these dossiers may be so pervasive that any single one 
may in fact project a fictional, “virtual” person, consisting in part of data 
mis-hung on the identity of the flesh and blood individual, bearing 
perhaps only a surface resemblance to that person.  Nonetheless, no 
matter how poorly the universe of virtual individuals may mirror the 
universe of flesh and blood individuals, the world may well treat a 
virtual individual as more real than the flesh and blood counterpart. 
                                                 
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000) (providing the general definition of “consumer 
report” for purposes of the FCRA). 
34 See Chris Cilliza and Jim VandeHei, In Ohio, a Battle of Databases, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 
2006, at A01 (discussing Republicans’ use of information about voters to “microtarget” 
them for particular campaign material). 
35 See infra text accompanying notes 37-59. 
36 Among those who perceive privacy this way are Alan F. Westin and Thomas Nagel.  
THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE 4 (2002); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY & 
FREEDOM 34 (1967). 
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2. The Big Business of Warehousing, Aggregating, and Analyzing Data 
In contrast to the private-sector entities that find, analyze, and 
aggregate such data, individuals have very little control over their 
personal data.37  The growth in the power of electronic information has 
sprouted entities, data aggregators, and data miners, who seek to collect 
the records from disparate sources, reassemble them into a digital report, 
and analyze them to gain a picture of that person, the image from which 
observers draw our transactional reputations.38  
These modern entities have their roots in the last century.  The first 
credit bureaus began to be organized in the late 1800s by merchants who 
needed to know who would repay loans and who might not.39  Since 
then, however, database architecture and power have increased to allow 
any minute information about any commercial transaction to be 
recorded, compared, reassembled, and analyzed.40  An individual’s 
transaction history comprises all sorts of information about that 
individual’s practices.  Accounts, past and present, payments made, 
delayed, or missed altogether, lawsuits pending, rental history, account 
balances and available credit, and employment history can all be part of 
a credit report.41  Unpaid parking tickets and library fines can also be 
                                                 
37 See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1259-60 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Enforcing Privacy Rights] (arguing 
that putting identity theft prevention on the shoulders of individuals puts the burden on 
the wrong parties; the security is only as good as the entities choose). 
38 See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 126-28 (2000) (describing the aggregated 
information about consumer transactions as “gossip”). 
39 EVAN HENDRICKS, CREDIT SCORES & CREDIT REPORTS: HOW THE SYSTEM REALLY 
WORKS, WHAT YOU CAN DO 177 (2d ed. 2005). 
40 Elisa Williams, The Man Who Knows Too Much, FORBES, Nov. 11, 2002, at 68.  The Fair 
Isaac Corporation, for example, offers algorithms that help retailers match purchasers to 
other information, such as the place the purchaser lives, the car the purchaser drives, and 
the living the purchaser earns.  Id. 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2000).  The FCRA defines a consumer report as follows: 
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, 
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used 
or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in 
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for— 
(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes; 
(B) employment purposes; or 
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this 
title. 
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collected.42  Experian, one of the three major consumer credit reporting 
agencies, advertises that it maintains more than 65 terabytes—that is, 65 
trillion bytes—of data on North American consumers and businesses,43 
including details on 215 million American consumers.44  Each of the big 
three credit reporting agencies receives more than 2 billion transaction 
records each month.45   
But while traditional credit reporting agencies have generally kept 
track of consumer accounts and bill-paying practices, the modern 
consumer data industry has started to track far more mundane 
information about a person’s transactions.  Advances in information 
technology have led to an industry of “data mining,” by which a miner 
sifts through personal information to find patterns by which to predict 
future behavior.46  This industry overlaps the traditional credit reporting 
industry, but may collect many more types of data far beyond those 
arising from routine financial transactions.  One example of such entities 
is ChoicePoint, which advertises that its database maintains information 
on more than 210 million individuals, from “demographic data, credit 
data, property and auto insurance projected renewal dates, and other 
insurance and financial attributes, all linked together for immediate and 
targeted deployment . . . .”47  ChoicePoint offers its clients a wealth of 
data services, ranging from pre-employment checks and public record 
searches to insurance claim analyses and identity verification services.48   
Where do these entities get these records?  Well, we shed 
aggregatable data at every turn.  We buy groceries with loyalty cards 
                                                                                                             
Id.  The definition continues to exclude certain reports from the general definition.  Id. 
§ 1681a(d)(2). 
42 Surprising Things Can Wreck Your Credit Score: Unpaid Parking Tickets, Overdue Library 
Books, Might Affect Credit (Aug. 22, 2005), http://www.nbc10.com/consumeralert/ 
4883326/detail.html. 
43 Experian, http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html (last visited Jan. 13, 
2007). 
44 Id. 
45 Robert Avery, Paul Calem, Glenn Canner, & Raphael Bostic, An Overview of Consumer 
Data and Credit Reporting, FED. RES. BULL., Feb. 2003, at 49. 
46 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, No. GAO-04-548, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a 
Wide Range of Uses 4 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf 
(defining “data mining as the application of database technology and techniques–such as 
statistical analysis and modeling–to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in 
data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of future results”). 
47 ChoicePoint, Precision Marketing, http://www.cp-pm.com/media/pdf/CPDL%20 
Brochure%20-%20Oct2005.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
48 ChoicePoint, Industry Solutions, http://www.choicepoint.com/industry/all_ 
products.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
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and information-ravenous merchants and marketers scoop up the 
records.49  These loyalty cards can yield millions of transactions each 
week.50  Every item bought can be tracked.51  But the products we buy 
are not the only grist we provide to the information mill.  Aggregators 
are also interested in the services individuals use, some of which can 
yield uncomfortably sensitive information as well.  For example, they 
may want to collect the details of our cell phone calls, including the 
numbers dialed and the time connected.52  The Medical Information 
Bureau, an association of insurance companies, allows its members to 
exchange medical information about individuals for, among other 
purposes, “risk management.”53 
So how does all this occur?  A business may create an electronic 
record of a sale, loan, payment, or other event.  Businesses warehouse 
their own data for their own purposes.  Stores may keep track of 
purchases to understand consumer preference, to track consumer 
returns, or to predict consumer behavior.  For example, Amazon uses 
existing purchase information to make suggestions to customers.54  Wal-
Mart uses point-of-sale transaction information and warehouses it to 
identify merchandising opportunities and to manage store inventory.55  
Financial institutions that participate in the Automated Clearinghouse 
keep records of the electronic payments that consumers make to buy all 
these goods and services.56  Any of these businesses may then provide 
their records of transactions to a data aggregator. 
                                                 
49 Grocery Store Loyalty Card Use Is Strong Despite Privacy Concerns, http://i-
newswire.com/pr1371.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  One study of 515 adults by Boston 
University’s School of Communications found that 86% of adults have at least one grocery 
store card, and three-quarters of them use a card nearly every time they shop.  Id. 
50 See, e.g., Catalina Marketing, http://www.catalinamarketing.com/our_advantage/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  For example, Catalina Marketing claims it logs over a 
quarter of 1 billion transactions per week from 21,000 supermarkets, tracking the buying 
behavior of over 100 million households.  Id. 
51 See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 21, at 1. 
52 Frank Main, Your Phone Records Are for Sale, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006. 
53 Medical Information Bureau, http://www.mib.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  This 
Boston-based company provides information to about 600 life insurance companies, many 
of which offer other types of insurance for which individuals’ histories impact risk, such as 
health or disability insurance.  Id.  Member companies report medical information to the 
MIB to be shared with other members.  Id. 
54 Amazon, www.amazon.com/gp/yourstore/ref+sv_1/002-8216248-8062414 (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
55 Walmart, http://www.walmartfacts.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
56 NACHA, http://www.nacha.org/About/default.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/6
2007] Modern Data Warehousing and Defamation 1075 
With this information, an aggregator’s subscriber can decide 
whether it wants to extend credit to that same individual.  Or perhaps 
the individual already has an account with the subscriber; the subscriber 
may be seeking an opportunity to raise the rate of an individual 
cardholder, and can only do so by learning that the same individual has 
paid another account late.57  The data created and collected by businesses 
has significant value to those who would like to identify future 
customers and political candidates who would like to identify support.58  
Even, and perhaps more disturbingly, governmental agencies have 
sought access to Americans’ transactional biographies.59   
As a result, a major problem arises when the transactions are 
mismatched and individuals’ images projected from all this digital data 
distort, leading to a virtual person whose reputation will be tied to the 
individual despite the mismatch. 
C. The Polluted Information Sea 
Individuals transact, businesses record those transactions, and 
aggregators collect those records, connecting the transactions and their 
details to the individuals to create digital biographies that they and 
others can mine.  However, careless use of information technology has 
led to aggregators ascribing significant events to the wrong persons.  A 
certain amount of information attributed to any one individual may be 
false.  As businesses, governmental units, and others store more data and 
increase access to that data, they will also store more inaccurate data and 
increase the risk that others, including data warehousers, will have 
access to it and further publish and disseminate it.  At the speed of light, 
the misinformation can spread to a wealth of interested watchers. 
Empirical evidence indicates that mismatching leads to inaccurate 
biographies alarmingly often, whether through undermatching or fuzzy 
matching.  According to the Federal Reserve Board, many consumer 
                                                 
57 See Patrick McGeehan, Soaring Interest Compounds Credit Card Woes for Millions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004.  Such a provision is called a “universal default clause,” and imposes a 
penalty rate when a consumer pays late to another creditor.  Id. 
58 See Kintera, http://www.kinterainc.com/site/C.OWL8JO07KZE/b.1485573/k.BE48/ 
Home.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  For example, Kintera, a software application service 
provider that supports non-profit organizations, advertises a software product called the 
Kintera Sphere that can be used by campaigns, fundraising organizations, and other 
groups to identify potential donors. 
59 Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial 
Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 595, 598, 611 (2004). 
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credit files contain incomplete or ambiguous information.60  One study 
found that almost half of consumer reporting complaints to the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) involved mismerged files.  In nearly two-
thirds of those complaints, the consumer’s information had been mixed 
with that of total strangers; in the remainder, the mismatched 
information belonged to relatives or former spouses.61  Another study 
found that nearly 80% of the reports examined contained mistakes of 
some kind, and a full quarter of the reports contained errors sufficiently 
serious to cause credit to be denied.62  Individuals who have purchased 
their own reports from ChoicePoint, a major data aggregator, have found 
errors of attribution ranging in import from the relatively minor, such as 
ownership of autos never owned, to major, such as the individual’s own 
death.63 
Information attributed to any one particular individual can be false 
in different ways.  The type of falsity addressed here arises when a 
particular event may in fact have occurred, but the event is treated as the 
deed not of the originating individual—for example, the person who in 
fact bought an item, took out a loan, missed a payment—but rather of 
someone else.  Misidentifications that hurt the target’s reputation 
defame.  While such misidentifications occurred before the modern 
information age, the rise of electronic records and their use by the 
consumer data industry has magnified the impact of this problem.64  
                                                 
60 Avery et al., supra note 45, at 70-71. 
61 U.S. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, CREDIT BUREAUS: PUBLIC ENEMY #1 AT THE FTC 
(Oct. 1993) (on file with author) (analyzing 140 complaints to the FTC).  The Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, required the FTC to report to Congress about the 
problems of mismerged files.  Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 318 (Dec. 4, 2003).  The report made a 
surface evaluation of the costs and benefits of requiring the three largest consumer 
reporting agencies, Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax, to match more points of 
identification, and concluded that requiring more matching would reduce mismerged files, 
and noted that mismerged files “are costly for consumers,” but nonetheless emphasized 
that stricter matching might lead to incomplete files which would decrease their value for 
users.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND 319 OF 
THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf.  The agency did not explain why 
mismerged files do not similarly impact uncertainty.  Id. 
62 ALISON CASSIDY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKI, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS 
IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 11, 13 (June 2004), available at http://www.uspirg.org/ 
uploads/BE/ev/BEevuv19a3KzsATRbZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf [hereinafter 
MISTAKES DO HAPPEN]. 
63 Bob Sullivan, ChoicePoint Files Found Riddled with Errors (Mar. 8, 2005), http://www. 
msnbc.msn.com/id/7118767/. 
64 See, e.g., Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1973) (misidentifying 
plaintiff as defendant in two lawsuits when in fact those suits were filed against another 
individual with the same first and last name). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/6
2007] Modern Data Warehousing and Defamation 1077 
Some errors occur because the identifying information of the actor is 
mistranscribed, others because otherwise accurate information is 
mismatched to the wrong person. 
1. Misattribution by Mistranscription 
Misattribution may arise when a direct party to a transaction 
mistranscribes the individual’s identifying information.65  That is, where 
a party memorializes some sort of financial event, the person or device 
recording it may fail to assign the event to the identity of its doer, but 
rather may attach it to the identity of someone else, or even of no one at 
all.  Such misidentification is routinely a matter of human error.  A clerk, 
for example, may mistype a social security number.66  One jobseeker lost 
many employment opportunities, learning too late that a sheriff office 
employee mistyped the social security number of a criminal, substituting 
the jobseeker’s social security number.67  Alternatively, a machine may 
malfunction.  A fictional, and highly visual, variation of this arises in the 
film Brazil, where a fly falls into a government office’s printer, causing 
the machine to type a “B” in place of a “T” in the name of a man sought 
by officials.  The shift of that one letter sends a swat team to storm into 
the house of the wrong man as he slept, arresting him in front of his 
horrified family, and dragging him away.  In a real life example, a 
consumer sued two consumer reporting agencies after they reported that 
he was a judgment debtor in an amount of nearly half a million dollars.68  
A county clerk had erroneously recorded the judgment in the docket 
book; in fact, the consumer was the plaintiff in the action, the judgment 
creditor, not the defendant; the result was a swing of nearly a million 
dollars in the plaintiff’s favor.69  However, even though the clerk 
corrected the information, the two agencies did not pick up the 
correction and accordingly misattributed the debt to the consumer in a 
report issued more than six months later.70   
                                                 
65 See infra notes 66-72. 
66 Christopher Conkey, US Gives Some Fraud Victims New Social Security Numbers (July 6, 
2005), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05187/533663.stm (describing case of 
jobseeker who learned too late that a sheriff’s clerk had mistyped his social security 
number as the number of a convicted criminal). 
67 Id. 
68 Frost v. Experian, No. 98-CIV-2106-JGK-JCP, 1999 WL 287373 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1999). 
69 Id. at *7. 
70 Id.  The court refused the agencies’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s 
claim that the defendants acted willfully, justifying punitive damages under the FCRA.  Id. 
at 8; see also Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1994) (where clerk 
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In an infamous instance of misattribution by mistranscription, the 
consumer reporting agency TRW, Experian’s predecessor, contracted 
with an outside company to review a Vermont town’s public records to 
find those consumers who had defaulted on their property taxes.71  The 
researcher copied information from the wrong rolls, and as a result, all 
compliant property owners in the town were reported as delinquent in 
paying their property taxes.72 
In contrast to these ordinary misattributions, sometimes 
misidentified information arises when a third party, an identity thief, 
intentionally misdirects the recorder into mistranscribing the victim’s 
identifying information as the thief’s, pinning the wrong identity to the 
act.  This crime has received marquee attention of late:73  with the rise of 
instant credit, electronic transactions, and easy access to personal 
identification keys such as social security numbers and account numbers, 
identity theft has soared.74  Both federal and state laws now specifically 
criminalize it.75  But identity theft is not new—impostors have likely 
been with us since sufficient people inhabited the earth to support it.76  
Nonetheless, the crime is much easier now that disconnected 
transactions have supplanted so many face-to-face ones. 
In a typical identity theft case, the thief uses a consumer’s identifying 
information to create new accounts with merchants, creditors, and other 
                                                                                                             
mistakenly recorded a judgment in a suit brought against two brothers in both their names 
when judgment was in fact against only one). 
71 Sharon Kindel, Garbage In: Credit Bureaus Have Terrible Error Rates, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 
29, 1992, at 61. 
72 Id. 
73 Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/top102005.htm (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2007).  For example, identity theft has been the subject of the most 
complaints to the FTC every year since 2000.  Id.  The FTC has developed a sizable set of 
web materials.  See Federal Trade Commission, Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, 
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
74 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM COMPLAINT DATA: FIGURES AND 
TRENDS, JANUARY 1-DECEMBER 31, 2005, http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/pdf/clearing 
house_2005.pdf.  Identity theft accounted for more than 255,000 complaints to the FTC’s 
fraud and identity theft complaint database, Consumer Sentinel, in 2005.  Id.  The 
complaints had increased by about 9000 from 2004.  Id. 
75 See, e.g., The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 928(b)(1), 
1028 (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 530.5-530.8 (West 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 190.77-190.84 
(McKinney 2005); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51 (Vernon 2003). 
76 HERODOTUS, THE HISTORY bk. 3, at 61 (David Grene trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1987).  
As just one example, in ancient Persia, a Magian impostor adopted the identity of Smerdis, 
King of Persia (and the second son of Cyrus the Great), after Smerdis was assassinated.  Id.  
The false Smerdis was overthrown and slain in 521 B.C., after reigning for seven months.  
Id. at 79. 
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third parties, then uses those accounts to acquire goods and services for 
which the thief will not pay.77  The misattribution arises when the 
business entity ties the transaction to the victim’s identity markers 
instead of the thief’s.  After failing to obtain the correct identifying 
information, the entity assigns the transaction to the wrong person.  
Eventually, the recording entity will report the transaction to a data 
aggregator, such as a consumer reporting agency, as being the victim’s 
work, rather than the thief’s.   
Public records become polluted by mistranscription as well.  For 
example, an identity thief may commit a crime in the name of another 
and, upon arrest, give the arresting officer the identifying information of 
the victim.  The jurisdiction of the arrest will dutifully record that 
information in a computer—thus further victimizing the original 
victim—and treat it as if the information were verified.  If we assume 
that the thief in fact committed the underlying crime, the falseness in the 
new information lies not in the fact of the event having occurred—the 
assault, the burglary, the drug use—but in the identity of the actor in the 
event.  Someone committed the act, but not the person the database now 
records as having done so.  
Civil public records have also become tainted.  Although less serious 
than a wrongful conviction, identity thefts in bankruptcy courts have 
been rising, leading some individuals to have to fight to have a 
bankruptcy they never filed removed from their name.78  In this case, it is 
the court clerk who misattributes the events to the victim, having failed 
to verify the filer’s identity. 
From one standpoint, the cause of this misattribution is the thief’s 
use of the identifying information of another.  However, from another, 
the cause of this misattribution is the failure of the recorder, business, or 
public entity to do as much as it could to verify the identity of those with 
whom they deal.  The significant damage that thieves do to individuals 
arises not from the work of the impostor, but from the responses of 
others.  It is not the thief who records the account, the creditor does that.  
It is not the thief who reports the new debt in the victim’s name, the 
creditor does that as well, and the aggregator, not the thief, falsely 
                                                 
77 See Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, supra note 73; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 
Coping with Identity Theft: Reducing the Risk of Fraud, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/ 
fs17-it.htm#crime (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (This sort of identity theft is also known as 
“‘true name fraud.’”). 
78 Peter C. Alexander, Identity Theft & Bankruptcy Expungement, 77 AM. BANKER L.J. 409, 
411-12 (2003). 
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reports to others that the debt is the victim’s, rather than the thief’s.  In 
this way, the damage done to a reputation by identity theft differs little 
from that caused by non-criminal carelessness.  For purposes of record 
matching, the intent of the actor matters less than the actions of the 
person or entity that tags the thief’s acts with the victim’s identity 
markers.  The injury suffered by identity theft victims would not arise 
without the participation of the third parties in the data market. 
Thus, although motivations behind mistranscription errors vary, the 
common underlying element is the creation of a record that describes an 
event that actually occurred, but ascribes it to the wrong person.  The 
event then pollutes the transactional biography of the misidentified doer, 
corrupting the image that the biography portrays to the world, and thus 
deflating (if negative) the degree of esteem the doer has earned.   
2. Misattribution by Mismatching 
Mistranscription is one form of mismatching but a more pervasive 
problem of misattribution arises where the identity information of a 
particular record of an event is mismatched to the identity of someone 
with superficially similar identifying information.  The three major 
consumer data aggregators, Experian, Trans Union, and Equifax (also 
known as consumer reporting agencies), do not simply add each new 
record to a consumer’s file the way, for instance, a lawyer would keep a 
file for a client and add to it letters from that client, pleadings from the 
client’s case, and such.79  Rather, data providers, such as merchants and 
creditors, send records to the agencies with the identity markers of the 
individual to whom the provider attributes the event, such as name, date 
of birth, and social security number, and the agencies store the records in 
their databases.80  When an agency’s subscriber seeks a report about a 
particular individual, the subscriber supplies identifying markers (or 
pegs, in Goffman’s terms) and, applying this identifying information, the 
agency’s computer runs an algorithm that searches the databases for 
records with matching, or similar, identifying information.81  Thus, the 
file is pulled together dynamically at that moment for the immediate 
purpose.82  The matching algorithm, rather than the record’s location, 
                                                 
79 HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 144. 
80 Id.; see also Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004). 
81 HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 144; see also Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972 (describing process); 
Apodaca v. Discover Fin. Servs., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D.N.M. 2006) (same); 
McKeown v. Sears Roebuck Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 917, 930-31 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (same). 
82 See Apodaca, 417 F. Supp. at 1224 (describing process); McKeown, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 
930-31 (describing process). 
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determines whether the record of a particular event will be assigned to 
the specific individual or not.83  The algorithm determines both the 
identity markers that it will examine and the degree of fuzziness it will 
tolerate in matching those markers.  For example, the algorithm of one 
major agency, Experian, uses thirteen matching elements, including not 
just a full social security number, but also a mere fragment.84  
Misattribution by mismatching may arise through undermatching or 
fuzzy matching. 
a. Undermatching 
Undermatching can arise when the identifying information attached 
to a particular event is insufficiently complete to avoid ambiguity.85  For 
example, an event may be identified by only a person’s name.  As an 
example of this sort of misattribution, a doctor’s office clerk may put the 
test results of one James Jones into the file, whether paper or electronic, 
of another James Jones.  Although other markers of the two individuals’ 
identities, such as middle name, date of birth, place of birth, and 
telephone number, may be different, the data is “undermatched”—
limited to the first and last names when more identifying information is 
necessary to match the record to a single individual. 
In the doctor’s office example, the creator of the record misidentifies 
the actor if she selects the wrong James Jones.  However, misattribution 
by undermatching also arises when the record is collected by a data 
aggregator that then uses the imprecise identifying information to 
misattribute the act to another.  This sort of misattribution, also known 
as mismerging, is often to blame for bad transactional biographies.86  In 
mismerging, a data aggregator incorrectly identifies a particular event as 
being the responsibility of the targeted individual.  In contrast to 
misattribution by mistranscription, where the error arises at the initial 
recording of the data, misattribution by mismatching arises when a party 
tries to match a particular record to the identity of someone already 
                                                 
83 HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 145-47. 
84 Id. at 146.  The agency’s algorithm also uses the following elements: last name; first 
name; middle name; suffix; age; gender; street number; street name; apartment number; 
city, state, and zip code; and trade account number.  Id. 
85 This concept is also sometimes referred to as “partial matching.”  See, e.g., Apodaca, 417 
F. Supp. at 1224 (describing logic); HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 148-51. 
86 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AM. AND NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT SCORE 
ACCURACY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 35 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/121702CFA_NCRA_Credit_Score_Report_Final.pdf 
[hereinafter CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY].  Nicknames, misspellings, transposed social 
security numbers, and mismatching all contribute to merging errors.  Id. 
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known.  The mismatching arises when a data aggregator chooses to 
undermatch the record to an individual on the basis of some identity 
markers.   
As an example of incomplete identifying information, a record may 
identify a transaction as belonging to a John Q. Public, and in fact the 
aggregator has records belonging to more than one—perhaps several—
John Q. Publics lurking within the depths of its databases.  The 
aggregator may assign the record to all of them when it goes fishing for a 
specific John Q. Public’s file, which is not a problem, necessarily, if it 
ends up on the record of the John Q. Public who incurred the transaction, 
but potentially quite a problem if it ends up on the record of a John Q. 
Public who did not.  For example, in Apodaca v. Discover Financial 
Services,87 a consumer named Victoria Apodaca spent nearly a year 
trying to disconnect the bankruptcy and debts of another woman, 
Victoria Lopez Apodaca, from her credit report.88  The aggregator does 
not intend to tie the fact of the event to the wrong individual, the wrong 
construction of Locke’s “organized Body,” but it does so anyway because 
it did not sufficiently identify the person on whose identity peg the event 
should be hung.  Such a mistake may be the result of an identity thief 
seeking to intentionally mislead a creditor or a consumer reporting 
agency into misreporting a transaction as having been incurred by the 
robbed.  Such a thief may have some, but not all, of the usual identity 
markers of the victim. 
Data aggregators are motivated to match each transaction that comes 
in to a particular consumer.  These transactions only have value to the 
aggregators’ subscribers who purchase the information if they are 
attributed to a particular individual.  Data aggregators’ customers do not 
subscribe to them to find out if a particular event occurred—that is, to 
find out whether someone, anyone, owes $5,000 to Sears, $3,000 of which 
comprises late fees and accumulated interest.  No, what subscribers to 
the credit reporting agencies and other data aggregators want to know is 
who bought what, who incurred that debt, who is responsible for repaying 
it.  The information of the transaction alone is not what makes the 
information valuable.  It is the matching of the transactions with the 
individual—the connecting piece—that makes the information valuable.  
This motivation can raise the risk of mistattribution. 
                                                 
87 417 F. Supp. 2d 1220. 
88 Id. at 1222-25.  Seven of nine digits in the two women’s social security numbers 
matched, but they lived in different towns and shared no other identifying markers.  Id. at 
1224. 
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The most routine sort of undermatching is matching on the basis of 
name alone.  However, as Erving Goffman has pointed out, the personal 
name as an identity marker, while the most commonly used, is at the 
same time far from the most reliable.89  The doubt is particularly high 
with relatively common names.  Undermatching has been visible lately 
in the mishaps of the Transportation Security Administration’s “No Fly” 
List, where travelers unfortunate enough to have a name the same as or 
similar to that of a suspected terrorist target are pulled aside for 
questioning.90  Similarly, in the 2000 election, some Florida voters were 
turned away from the polls as being ineligible to vote based simply on 
the match of their names to names on a list of convicted felons pulled 
together by a data aggregator.91  The rise in the sheer number of 
American consumers indicates that relying merely on personal names to 
tie an event to an individual is increasingly risky, at least where the 
event is disconnected from that individual so that no party to the 
transaction is familiar with any other.  Given that more than 2.9 million 
individuals reside in the United States, the chances that many of them 
will have duplicate names appear to be quite high.92  Thus, matching by 
name alone appears foolishly to invite misattribution. 
Additionally, undermatching is often to blame when an aggregator 
poisons an individual’s financial transaction biography with an identity 
thief’s transactions.  A data provider will report an account using the 
identifying information provided by the thief.  While often the name and 
social security number attached to the thief’s transaction will match 
those on the victim’s biography, nonetheless other identity pegs 
provided by a thief that would pinpoint identity, such as date of birth, 
place of birth, address, and telephone number, will conflict with those in 
                                                 
89 GOFFMAN, supra note 1, at 58; see also CECIL ROLPH, PERSONAL IDENTITY (1957). 
90 Complaint, Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin. (W.D. Wash. 2005) No. CV04-0763.  The 
ACLU has filed a class action complaint against the Transportation Security 
Administration, among others, alleging that hundreds of innocent travelers have been 
detained because they have names similar or identical to those on the “No Fly” list, 
notwithstanding that they have no ties to terrorist activities.  Id.  According to the ACLU’s 
complaint, the No-Fly List includes additional identity markers for its members, including 
date of birth, nationalities, and passport numbers, but the list nonetheless is incomplete 
and inaccurate.  Id. ¶ 20. 
91 Robert E. Pierre, Botched Name Purge Denied Some the Right to Vote, WASH. POST, May 
31, 2001, at A01.  The aggregator, DBT Technologies, has since been acquired by 
ChoicePoint.  Id. 
92 State and County Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  The United States Census Bureau estimates that the number of 
people in the United States in 2005 was 296,410,404—an increase of 5.3% from 2000.  Id. 
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the aggregator’s database.93  When the aggregator runs its matching 
algorithm through its warehouse, the algorithm pulls up the fraudulent 
accounts, matching only an inadequate number of identity markers 
while disregarding additional identity markers that conflict with the 
victim’s information.94 
The advances in data technology have contributed to errors by 
undermatching.  The risk of undermatching arises not just because so 
many people have the same name as someone else, but because the pool 
of collected data has grown so large.  A data aggregator that culled only 
data from one particular area, geographic or demographic, would run a 
lower risk of collecting records that bear the same name, but nevertheless 
refer to two (or even more) different individuals.   
Furthermore, undermatching increases when we disaggregate the 
doer from the deed.  The record, once it leaves the context of the original 
event, becomes skinned of the additional identifying attributes that 
context provides.  For example, the record of a James Jones in a certain 
doctor’s office will be identified by the other identity markers the office 
may use that do not become part of the record.  The office staff may be 
perfectly able to keep their two James Joneses apart, whether because of 
office filing practices or because they suffer from different ailments or 
because of some other distinction.  But once the record leaves that 
context, it loses those markers and must compete with other records of 
other James Joneses.   
b. Fuzzy matching 
The second main type of mismatched transactional information 
arises not from undermatching, but from fuzzy matching.95  Fuzzy 
matching imposes vagueness on identity markers, blurring precision.  
Vagueness can be imposed at the level of a given individual marker, for 
example, where the name James Jones is deemed to match Jim Jones and 
Jimmy Jones.  The vagueness can also be imposed at the next level up, 
where multiple markers are matched.  For instance, a record will be 
matched to a person if the name and the city of residence match, even if 
                                                 
93 See Wade v. Equifax, No. 02-C-3205, 2003 WL 22089694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003) 
(where provider who had reported an account opened by an identity thief as being the 
plaintiff’s, even though the plaintiff’s name, Lori Wade, differed substantially from the 
name the thief used, Lori White). 
94 See, e.g., Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2000). 
95 See THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1048 
(1993) (noting that in computing and logic usage, “fuzzy” can be “defined so as to allow for 
imprecise set-membership”). 
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other markers, such as date of birth, do not.  So, for example, one data 
aggregator, a consumer reporting agency, misattributed a bankruptcy of 
a “Donela Reed” to her brother “Donel.”96  In addition to similar names, 
the siblings had similar social security numbers; nonetheless, the names, 
social security numbers, and, obviously, genders of the two individuals 
were distinctly different.97  The fuzziness calls a match even though the 
two sets of identity markers, while overlapping, do not match entirely.  
For example, the aggregator may identify a record to an individual with 
a similar, yet distinctly different, last name if the first names match.98  
Aggregators’ algorithms, which search through the data warehouse for 
records with similar, but not identical, identifying information use fuzzy 
matching to collect transactional biographies.99 
Fuzziness will often poison the data sea by falsely attributing one 
person’s action to another.  However, some fuzziness may lead to 
accurate attribution, which is why data aggregators employ it.  An 
accurate reputation may in fact depend on imprecise or unverifiable 
information.  As Samuel Johnson once said, “If a man could say nothing 
against a character but what he can prove, history could not be 
written.”100  If the only transactions that could be ascribed to an 
individual were those for which the doer’s identity had been fully 
verified, many who depend on aggregators’ reports to accurately portray 
the image of the individual would be misled.  For example, a James Jones 
may in fact have signed his name as Jim, and to reject that record on the 
basis of the mismatch in first names would lead to a financial biography 
for James Jones that portrays a truncated image, leading to an inaccurate 
reputation.  Nonetheless, errors from fuzzy matching could be 
minimized by verifying the match of additional markers that are 
unlikely to vary, such as the date or place of birth. 
D. Inaccuracies in the Data Warehouses 
Not all misattributions of transactions lead to litigation, but those 
that do indicate that mismatching errors are hardly unavoidable.  An 
aggregator may match records even when the names have only a passing 
resemblance.  For example, one data aggregator attributed the account of 
                                                 
96 Reed v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111-12 (D. Minn. 2004). 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., McKeown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 917, 925-26 (W.D. Wis. 
2004) (agency matched record of the death of an individual named McOwen to the 
plaintiff, notwithstanding the difference in names). 
99 See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. 
100 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 727 (1998). 
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an identity thief who had used the name “Lori White” to someone 
named “Lori Wade.”101  Similarly, in McKeown v. Sears, a consumer 
reporting agency attributed the account of a James N. McOwen to the 
plaintiff, James McKeown.102  The plaintiff learned of the misattribution 
when he tried to apply for credit, and an agency issued a credit report 
for him indicating that he was dead.103  The error arose because Sears 
had noted in its own files that an account holder named James N. 
McOwen had died, but the note lacked additional identity markers, 
raising a real risk of undermatching.104  Later, Sears matched the report 
of death with the plaintiff’s account number, apparently by fuzzily, very 
fuzzily, matching the record by name to the plaintiff, even though the 
two had different middle initials, different numbers of letters in their last 
names, and different arrangements of those letters.105  Two consumer 
reporting agencies then published the deceased notation.106  Thus, 
through a combination of fuzzy matching and undermatching, the 
plaintiff was reputed to be dead. 
Even matching first names and last names can lead an aggregator to 
wrongfully ascribe one individual’s act to another.  For example, in Jones 
v. Credit Bureau of Great Garden City, Inc.,107 the defendant, a consumer 
reporting agency, had ascribed to a “James R. Jones” the debt of a “James 
D. Jones.”108  The agency made this match notwithstanding that the two 
individuals had different middle initials, different addresses, and 
different dates of birth.109  Even if such fuzzy matching were an 
appropriate way to ascribe information in the case of a rare surname, it 
seems downright rash in the case of a last name such as “Jones,” 
especially when combined with a relatively common first name.  The 
court agreed, finding that the consumer reporting agency could be 
negligent for failing to verify the identity of the debtor.110  In a similar 
                                                 
101 Wade v. Equifax, No. 02-C-3205, 2003 WL 22089694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003). 
102 McKeown, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 925-26. 
103 Id. at 925.  The court denied the motion of a consumer reporting agency, Trans Union, 
to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim under the FCRA.  Id. at 925-26, 935.  In response to the 
plaintiff’s dispute, the agency reaffirmed the validity of the match.  Id.  Even though Sears 
reaffirmed the identity of the account, it noted that the name on the account differed from 
the one the agency provided with the dispute.  Id. 
104 Id. at 924. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 No. 87-1302-C, 1989 WL 107747 (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 1989). 
108 Id. at **3-4. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at *7.  The injured debtor and his wife brought a claim pursuant to the FCRA.  Id.  
The court was unimpressed with the agency’s matching techniques: “Defendants’ transfer 
of information from one debtor’s credit file into another debtor’s credit file is undoubtedly 
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fashion, a consumer reporting agency mixed together the financial 
events of a “William Daniel Thompson, Jr.” and “William Douglas 
Thompson, III,” notwithstanding that the records’ identifying 
information included different social security numbers, different 
addresses, and different occupations.111 
Some aggregators’ fuzzy matching policies seem nearly designed to 
create false biographies.  For example, one agency has used an algorithm 
that attributes a record to an individual if any two of the identity markers 
matches, yet deems the name marker matched if the main name, without 
any suffix such as “junior,” matches.112  Furthermore, the agency may 
verify the match even after a misidentified individual challenges it.113  
This, predictably, will create false virtual images whenever a father and 
an adult son named after him live at the same address.  The image 
portrayed by the aggregator’s report will be a mish-mash of the two, the 
reputation true to neither. 
Fuzzy matching of public records can also lead an aggregator to 
falsely report that one individual’s bankruptcy was filed by another.  A 
consumer reporting agency reported one woman’s bankruptcy in the 
name of another woman who lived in a different town, was born on a 
different day, and had a different middle name and a different social 
security number.114  In another case of false attribution of bankruptcy, a 
mortgagee reported that the bankruptcy of one co-obligor on a mortgage 
was in fact that of the other, notwithstanding that the two had dissimilar 
names and that the non-bankrupt borrower had continued to pay the 
debt.115   
                                                                                                             
a serious and significant act which calls for more precautions than a similarity of names.”  
Id.; see also Apodaca v. Discover Fin. Servs., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D.N.M. 2006) 
(denying agency’s motion for summary judgment where two women shared the same 
name and seven digits of their social security numbers but nothing else). 
111 Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(affirming lower court’s judgment that a consumer reporting agency’s verification process 
that did not require sufficient “points of correspondence” between the consumer and the 
file or did not have an adequate auditing procedure to foster accuracy, violated the FCRA). 
112 Moore v. Equifax Info. Servs. L.L.C., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2004) 
(denying agency’s motion for summary judgment on claim brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681e, 1681i (2000)). 
113 Id. 
114 Kenneth R. Gosslein & Matthew Kauffman, A Credit Trap for Consumers, HARTFORD 
COURANT, May 26, 2003, at A1. 
115 Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Additionally, criminal record information can be particularly 
damaging, yet is also especially subject to mismatching errors.116  In fact, 
the poor quality of compiled “[r]ap sheets” was one reason the Supreme 
Court upheld the denial of a Freedom of Information Act request to 
obtain such documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
Press.117  Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, blamed the poor quality 
of the sheets on the amount of information:  “Because of the volume of 
rap sheets, they are sometimes incorrect or incomplete and sometimes 
contain information about other persons with similar names.”118  That 
was in 1989; since then, the volume of personally identifiable 
information has grown tremendously. 
Not just individuals have data mismatched; businesses can suffer 
from undermatching and fuzzy matching as well.  In one commercial 
defamation case, the plaintiff, County Vanlines, Inc., sued a consumer 
reporting agency for defamation after it was denied a loan because the 
agency had sent the intended lender information about negative credit 
events that were incurred by a business with the similar but, nonetheless, 
distinctly different name of County Van and Storage, Inc.119  The agency 
did so notwithstanding that the transactions took place before the target 
moving company had even incorporated.120  The defendant justified the 
loosely-matching algorithm on the grounds that precision would 
eliminate accurate and relevant data.121 
These cases indicate that some credit reporting agencies do relatively 
little meaningful matching of the data already in their data warehouses 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 412-14 (4th Cir. 2001).  
The plaintiff had applied for a job and had truthfully represented on the application that he 
had not been convicted of a felony, although he had been convicted of a misdemeanor.  Id. 
at 417.  The investigating agency uncovered the misdemeanor as part of the background 
check, but misreported it as a felony based on the erroneous opinion of the county clerk, 
which the agency did not verify.  Id.  The court of appeals vacated summary judgment, 
which was favorable to the agency, based on a factual dispute raised by the plaintiff’s claim 
that the agency had violated the FCRA by failing to use reasonable procedures to assure 
the maximum possible accuracy of the information in the plaintiff’s report.  Id. 
117 489 U.S. 749, 752 (1989).  The Court held that the FBI could deny access to the rap 
sheets pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), which allows an agency to deny a FOIA request 
for “law enforcement records or information about a private citizen” if disclosure could 
“reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s privacy.”  Id. at 780. 
118 Id. at 752. 
119 County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385-86 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
120 Id. at 386. 
121 Id. at 388-89 (reciting testimony of the technical manager of the defendant). 
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before attributing events to a particular individual, leading to the high 
risk that the individual was not in fact the person who participated in 
that event. 
E. The Power of Bad Data 
In sum, advances in information technology have led to businesses, 
creditors, and others storing digital records of consumers’ financial 
transactions.  Technology has helped speed the duplication and 
distribution of these sorts of records.  Data aggregators can then 
warehouse and analyze them, both for the benefit of those with which an 
individual currently does business and for those that would like to find 
new individuals with whom to do business.  In this way, transactional 
biographies develop, creating a virtual image.  However, errors abound 
in the sea of data, a “frothy Chaos” of undermatched and fuzzily 
matched information that taints people’s biographies with gossip and 
rumors.122  Accordingly, the image that observers treat as though it 
faithfully represents someone may not in fact do so.  However, how 
important are these errors?  What impact can a false biography have on 
individuals and on society at large?  How does such digitized 
information have more power than its print version?  As discussed 
below, it has so much power that it can effectively shut a consumer out 
of the opportunity to enter into new transactions. 
The same characteristics of digitized, networked data that give it so 
much power pertain to that data even when it is false.  While 
information about individuals has never been perfectly accurate, 
inaccurate data has more impact now than ever for the same reasons that 
accurate data does.123  First, data is much more accessible than it used to 
be.  Accordingly, what errors might have been seen by just a few 
viewers—albeit viewers who could possibly have great power over the 
subject of that news (as one imagines William the Conqueror had)—can 
now be released onto the Worldwide Web and accessed anywhere by 
anyone with an Internet connection.  Furthermore, the information age 
has detached data from the original actor and from the transaction that 
created it, which means that the observer of the electronic record may 
never perceive any supplemental information that could correct or 
ameliorate misattributed information held in a physical record.  Because 
the data and its creators, storers, and users are often so detached from 
the person to whom it pertains, it may be far more difficult for an 
                                                 
122 Montaigne, supra note 2. 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 131-33. 
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individual to correct it.  A false report of someone’s death in a small 
community, for example, could be easily remedied simply by the alive-
and-well person appearing, in the flesh, before the person who started 
the rumor.  If the data were in a paper record, that record could be 
corrected.  The person could similarly appear before those who had been 
falsely told (or had read) of the death.  The chances that the original 
record had been copied many times were likely small and, by correcting 
the original, the individual could be reasonably sure that any copies in 
the future would omit the inaccurate item.  Now, however, an individual 
may learn of a false attribution only after the record has been copied and 
distributed far and wide and, even if able to correct it at the original 
source, may have no ability to retrieve all the bad copies. 
Face-to-face transactions have yielded to the convenience and 
efficiency of electronic ones, and information generated from those 
transactions gains impact because it is much less likely to be paired with 
or ameliorated by first-hand impressions.  For example, a mortgage 
decision might well come down to a simple credit score,124 a number 
sprung from information, whether accurate or not, linked to one’s credit 
history, without the lender ever meeting the applicant face-to-face.125  
Even if the borrower actually meets with a lender’s representative, that 
representative will likely rely on reports generated not from (or at least 
                                                 
124 See infra text accompanying note 134. 
125 The 2003 revisions to the FCRA define a credit score as follows: 
(i) . . . a numerical value or a categorization derived from a statistical 
tool or modeling system used by a person who makes or arranges a 
loan to predict the likelihood of certain credit behaviors, including 
default (and the numerical value or the categorization derived from 
such analysis may also be referred to as a “risk predictor” or “risk 
score”); and 
(ii) does not include— 
(I) any mortgage score or rating of an automated 
underwriting system that considers one or more factors in 
addition to credit information, including the loan to value 
ratio, the amount of down payment, or the financial assets of 
a consumer; or 
(II) any other elements of the underwriting process or 
underwriting decision. 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 212(b) (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(2)(A) (2000)).  As 
amended, the Act requires agencies to disclose credit scores to consumers upon request.  
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 212(b) (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f)(1)).  Credit scores have 
even been used by airlines to screen passengers for potential security risks.  Donna 
Havorsen, For Some, Use of Credit Scores Doesn’t Add Up, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), 
Mar. 13, 2003, at 1A. 
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not solely from) the lender’s own experiences with the borrower, but 
from those of many others.126 
Aside from practical damages such as these, however, false 
attribution of others’ deeds damages the dignity of a person as well.  
Both of these types of damages are discussed below. 
1. Tangible Damages to Reputation 
The “digital dossier” of our commercial transactions with others has 
enormous power:127  it can determine whether and on what terms a 
person can obtain a credit card, rent an apartment, buy a home, get a 
particular job, or obtain utility service.128  The dossier has this power 
regardless of whether the information within it is true.  The creditor, 
landlord, mortgagor, or business will decide whether to do business with 
an individual and, if so, the terms of that business, based on the history 
prepared by the data aggregator, regardless of the accuracy of that 
reported history.  
For our purposes, “reputation” refers to the perception of the 
community of the construct, the constitutive parts, of the individual.129  
False data that is negative damages that perception by lowering the 
estimation of the person in the eyes of those that check for worthiness to 
participate in commercial transactions.  Observers identify the image of a 
person with the person as he or she really is.  Accordingly, a reputation 
arising from the image created by the mis-merged information will 
nonetheless be treated as true to that individual. 
As discussed above, mismatching errors on credit reports are 
common, and they are far from harmless.130  The Consumer Federation 
of America reported in 2002 that errors in consumer credit reports could 
cost consumers millions of dollars in higher costs for credit.131  A 2004 
                                                 
126 See also HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 40-45. 
127 See SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 21, at 1-2, 49. 
128 A regulatory agency may allow a utility company to demand a deposit from a 
residential applicant based on the credit history attributed to an individual.  See, e.g., 83 ILL 
ADMIN. CODE § 280.50(a) (2006) (allowing utility companies to demand a deposit from 
residential service applicant’s whose credit scores fail to meet the service’s standards). 
129 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
130 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88, 93-98. 
131 CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86.  Of the credit reports reviewed, 29% 
contained serious errors—false delinquencies or accounts that did not belong to the 
consumer—that could cause a creditor to deny credit.  Id. at 6.  In 2003, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office concluded that more study concerning the accuracy of credit reports is 
needed.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER CREDIT: LIMITED INFORMATION EXISTS 
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study found that one in four of the credit reports reviewed contained 
errors sufficiently serious to cause a creditor to deny credit; many of 
these errors were bankruptcies, accounts, and other items that did not 
belong to the identified individual.132   
To illustrate the crippling effects that mismatching of electronic data 
can cause, we will use a fictional individual, Charlie Consumer, who has 
led a fairly ordinary life, transaction-wise.  Somewhere else a Charley 
Consumer, who has the same last name and a similar first name to our 
subject’s, has lived the life of a deadbeat.  The two may live near one 
another and may even have similar social security numbers.  
Nonetheless, the two have no other identity markers in common—that 
is, they have different dates of birth, different places of birth, different 
(though perhaps similar) social security numbers, and so forth.   
Charley-the-scoundrel acquires a credit card from a credit card 
company and uses it to mount up debts that he failed to pay.  The credit 
card company records the delinquency and reports it, associated with 
the name, address, date of birth, social security number, and telephone 
number of the originating Charley, to a consumer reporting agency to 
which the company subscribes.  The agency stores the record in its vast 
data warehouse, where it stays until called up. 
This record, if fuzzily matched to the creditworthy Charlie, can 
devastate his ability to develop and live his life.  It can keep him from 
buying a house,133 or perhaps allow him to do so only at a much higher 
interest rate.134  In effect, Charlie is charged with being someone who 
                                                                                                             
ON THE EXTENT OF CREDIT REPORT ERRORS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 17 
(July 31, 2003). 
132 CASSIDY & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 62, at 6, 11.  The study by the Massachusetts 
Public Interest Research Group in 2004 of 154 consumers and their credit reports found that 
79% of the credit reports contained mistakes.  Id. at 4.  One in four contained serious errors 
that could result in the denial of credit; nearly one in three contained credit accounts listed 
as open that had been closed by the consumer.  Id. 
133 See infra text accompanying note 134. 
134 See McCloud v. Homeside, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (plaintiff whose 
former mortgage lender wrongfully reported her as delinquent could qualify only for 
“‘sub-prime’” financing at an elevated rate); Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 306 F. 
Supp. 2d 873, 876-77 (D. Minn. 2004) (alleging that an erroneous mismatch led a mortgagee 
to offer plaintiff an interest rate one half percent higher on a fifteen year loan); McKeown v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 917, 925-926 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (plaintiff who was 
falsely matched with the record of a dead individual lost the opportunity for a thirty-year 
fixed mortgage and instead had to take an adjusted rate mortgage with only the first five 
years fixed); Gordon v. Greenpoint Credit, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1009 (S.D. Iowa 2003) 
(erroneous credit report caused two lenders to deny plaintiffs a loan and a third lender to 
offer a loan at an elevated rate). 
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largely lived the same life as he did, but who incurred this bad debt.  The 
bank, however, treats the blended image of Charlie and Charley as being 
a true portrayal of Charlie’s transaction history.  Charlie’s reputation for 
creditworthiness has suffered from the mismatch of Charley’s 
information to his identity. 
If Charlie seeks instead to rent a home, a report containing Charley’s 
bad debt may keep him from being able to do so.135  It may also prevent 
him from getting a job.136  Employers may rescind a job offer, or even fire 
an employee, if dissatisfied with the individual’s financial history.137  In 
fact, employers commonly scan this kind of information; according to 
one survey, more than one-third of employers surveyed used credit 
reports to screen candidates.138   
By the time Charlie learns through these denials and rejections that 
his biography has been contaminated by false information, it may be too 
late to repair the image that the inaccurate biography projects.  For 
example, one consumer lost his job after a consumer reporting agency 
incorrectly ascribed a drug conviction to him, when in fact the conviction 
had been incurred by a man with the same first and last name, but with a 
different middle name and date of birth.139  In such cases, the consumer 
has no right to delay the decision while the record is corrected.  
                                                 
135 Motoko Rich, TURF; A Blacklist for Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, at F1 (describing 
suit brought against tenant screening agency alleging that the company provided 
incomplete and inaccurate information).  Many landlords use tenant screening companies 
that aggregate information from, among other sources, consumer reporting agencies.  Id.; 
see Josh Barbanel, Residential Real Estate; Suit Disputes the Accuracy of Tenant Screening 
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B8 (describing tenants who were unable to rent new 
apartments because a tenant screening company reported that they had been involved in 
housing lawsuits, even where suits were resolved in the tenants’ favor). 
136 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 213, 217 (D.D.C. 1993) (involving 
suit arising after plaintiff was fired because agency reported felony drug conviction in 
name of James Ray Wiggins to the plaintiff’s identity, James Russell Wiggins, even though 
their dates of birth differed); see also supra text accompanying note 125.  Although the FCRA 
requires employers to obtain a job applicant’s consent to the credit search, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) (2000), nothing prevents an employer from conditioning an offer on such 
consent. 
137 See HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 4-6. 
138 Andrea Coombes, Job Seeker’s Obstacle: Bad Credit (June 17, 2004), http://www.market 
watch.com/news/story/story.aspx?siteid=mktw&guid=%7B282DE3FC-0D52-4211-AB1F-
A07A0A35CEFD%7D.  Federal law requires employers to obtain the employee’s or 
applicant’s consent, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A), but the employer may fire the employee or 
deny the application if consent is refused.  Id. 
139 Wiggins v. Dist. Cablevision, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 484, 488-89 (D.D.C. 1994) (an example 
of fuzzy matching); see also Nelski v. Ameritech, No. 244644, 2004 WL 1460001, at *1 (Mich. 
Ct. App. June 29, 2004) (the defendant, a mobile telephone services provider, opened up an 
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Just as a tainted credit record may deny him the ability to find a 
place to live or work, it may prevent Charlie from buying or leasing a 
car.140  It may prevent him from obtaining additional credit cards.  
Possibly worse, his existing credit card company could routinely scour 
the records aggregated at agencies for signs of instability, and use the 
record of the delinquent account to invoke a universal default clause that 
allows the card company to raise the interest rate on a charge account 
that Charlie really does own, a financial consequence that could in fact 
cause the very default that Charlie had thus far been able to avoid.141  
Charlie may even lose existing credit cards entirely.142  Likewise, Charlie 
could be charged higher insurance premiums or even lose insurance—
life, property, or health—altogether.143  Bad credit, even if not the 
responsibility of the consumer, can prevent a consumer from obtaining 
student loans, delaying or even eliminating the opportunity for a college 
degree. 
All of these consequences, although terrible in the aggregate, appear 
to be merely monetary.  However, misattributed information can 
threaten not just finances, but liberty itself.  If Charley develops a 
criminal history, that history could imperil Charlie.  In one dramatic 
example of undermatching identifying information, a bank opened up 
an account in the name of an identity theft victim, even though the thief 
used only the victim’s temporary license, which had no photograph, and 
the signature on the account application did not match the signature on 
the license.144  The thief then wrote several bad checks and the defrauded 
                                                                                                             
account for an identity thief in the plaintiff’s name and continued to report the account as 
hers even three years after it appeared to have acknowledged its error). 
140 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 951 F.2d 905, 905-06 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(granting creditor’s motion for summary judgment on FCRA claim based on lender’s false 
report that borrower had defaulted on her car loan payments, an error that caused her to be 
rejected for another car purchase). 
141 See Patrick McGeehan, Soaring Interest Compounds Credit Card Woes for Millions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at sec. 1, col. 5, p. 1. 
142 See McMillan v. Experian, 170 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2001) (defendant had 
merged records of the plaintiff’s son, who had the same name as the plaintiff, into the 
plaintiff’s report, leading a credit card company to terminate plaintiff’s card and an insurer 
to deny insurance). 
143 For example, in Boris v. ChoicePoint Servs., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855 (W.D. Ky. 
2003), a consumer reporting agency falsely ascribed to the plaintiff five different claims that 
she had not made, leading her insurance company to send her a nonrenewal notice.  See 
also Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 443, 275 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1966) 
(upholding claim against physician where physician had reported false information to the 
Medical Information Bureau, a data aggregator, which led to the plaintiff’s insurer cutting 
off the plaintiff’s disability benefits). 
144 Patrick v. Union St. Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Ala. 1996). 
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merchants sought recovery, which led to warrants being issued in eleven 
different jurisdictions for the victim’s arrest.  Although the victim was 
able to get those warrants of which she learned dismissed by showing 
that the signatures on the checks did not match hers, she was eventually 
arrested on other warrants and imprisoned in four different jurisdictions 
over a period of ten days before finally winning her release.145  Similarly, 
a check cashing service falsely imputed to a store clerk that a customer 
was part of a “fraud ring,” which caused the customer to be arrested and 
imprisoned.146  This case illustrates the difficulties of correcting such 
misinformation; the consumer stayed imprisoned for ninety days, even 
though the agency learned within one day that the information was 
incorrect.147 
Nonetheless, monetary consequences are more common.  However, 
those consequences may arise not as a direct result of the record’s 
presence in the biography, but from the impact of that record on a 
person’s credit score.  The mismatched information may not even appear 
directly before a creditor.  Users will make decisions based not on a 
reading of the entire report, but on the basis of an individual’s credit 
score, an algorithm that numerically weighs the information about a 
consumer.148  The Fair Isaac Corporation produces credit scoring 
software that creditors use to determine access to credit and pricing of 
credit for consumers.149  That score can determine whether a consumer 
receives credit and, if so, at what price.150  A score too low will render a 
                                                 
145 Id.  A similarly sinister version of identity theft is criminal record identity theft, where 
an impostor commits one or more crimes in the victim’s name by providing the victim’s 
identity to law enforcement when caught.  See Beth Givens, Identity Theft: The Growing 
Problem of Wrongful Criminal Records, Presentation at the SEARCH National Conference 
on Privacy, Technology and Criminal Justice Information in Washington, D.C. (June 1, 
2000), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/wcr.htm; see also Michael W. Perl, Comment, It’s 
Not Always About the Money: Why the State Identity Theft Laws Fail to Adequately Address 
Criminal Record Identity Theft, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 169, 169-71 (2003) (discussing 
criminal record identity theft and “‘reverse criminal record identity theft’” where the thief 
uses the victim’s personal information to hide the thief’s own criminal record). 
146 Haque v. CompUSA, Inc., No. 02-10345-RWZ, 2003 WL 117986, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 
2003) (denying agency’s motion to dismiss the consumer’s FCRA claim; the court also ruled 
that the plaintiff stated a claim for false imprisonment against the agency). 
147 Id. at *1. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 38-41. 
149 See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86, at 41 (noting the tremendous impact of 
credit scoring companies on the access to “essential consumer services,” and pointing out 
that “[m]any decision makers who use scoring systems to evaluate consumer applications 
do not even understand the systems themselves . . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
150 My Fico, http://www.myfico.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  The Fair Isaac 
Corporation Web site identifies interest rates available to consumers in various ranges of 
credit scores that fall between 500 and 850.  Id. 
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consumer subject to the sub-prime loan market, at great increased cost to 
the consumer.151  In fact, a score too low may even prevent a consumer 
from being able to open a checking account at a bank.152  The practice of 
feeding information into an algorithm to produce a number—one three 
digit number—that purports to assess an individual’s worthiness to 
participate in future transactions also has increased the power of false 
data on consumers’ lives.  Under the general rule of garbage-in-garbage-
out, a false piece of information associated with a consumer may well 
drag down that consumer’s credit score, depending on the weight the 
credit scoring algorithm assigns to that item.  However, neither the user 
nor the individual will know from the score itself that a false item 
deflated it. 
One study estimated that one in five consumers was likely to be 
assigned a lower score than deserved because of errors or inconsistencies 
in that consumer’s credit history.153  The study further estimated that 
inaccurate financial biographies put tens of millions of consumers at risk 
of suffering higher-priced credit, or even being eliminated from the 
credit market.154  Many such consumers cannot afford the damage that 
the mismatched information will do to their ability to pay their bills.  
While a consumer could choose to pay cash for everything, even going 
“off-the-grid” will not avoid the consequences of the information, and a 
consumer may well be stuck with denying the acts of his or her distorted 
image projected from the computerized record.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that an individual’s life is held up by a false credit item, the 
individual is not fully participating in the benefits of being an American 
consumer.  Thus, mismatching of transactions can have a devastating 
impact on a person’s ability to find work and shelter and to live 
affordably.  As discussed below, it can also cause intangible but 
nonetheless genuine damage to personality and dignity. 
2. Damage to Personality and Dignity 
Transactions with others express an individual personality, defined 
by Margaret Radin as “a continuing character structure encompassing 
future projects or plans, as well as past events and feelings.”155  
Obviously, a transactional biography can reveal past events.  However, 
                                                 
151 See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86, at 37-38. 
152 Harriet Johnson Brackey, Banks Check Potential Customers’ Credit, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 
5, 2004, at 1E; see also HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 3-4. 
153 See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86, at 37. 
154 See id. at 36-37. 
155 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 968 (1982). 
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the individual items can also reveal a personal gestalt that can hold 
enough of the essence of an individual to predict future projects or 
plans—after all, that is why third parties seek it, to predict future 
behavior.  Thus, the record of transactions radiates an image of 
personality, though perhaps an imperfect one.  Outsiders can compute 
from the individual acts an estimate of that person’s character with 
respect to a particular trait—in other words, a reputation.  As 
individuals, we express our personalities through our transactions:  the 
stores we patronize, the items we buy, from books to toothpaste, the 
charities and causes that we support, the persons we call, and even, or 
perhaps especially, the Web sites we visit.  In the digital age, that self is 
constructed for many interested watchers by external automated 
processes.  When the choices of another are attributed to us, we lose 
control over the images that others believe faithfully represent our 
choices. 
While reputation is external to the self, existing in the minds of 
others,156  under the Kantian characterization, dignity is a matter of 
intrinsic worth that recognizes that each person merits being 
acknowledged as an “individual and independent personality.”157  By 
recognizing dignity we acknowledge a person’s right to freely develop 
that person’s personality.158  Arguably, information aggregation itself 
violates human dignity by depersonalizing individuals and treating 
them as mere objects to some other ends.159  However, damage to dignity 
worsens when the information is misaggregated to attribute a deed to 
the wrong doer. 
To mischaracterize someone’s personality is to injure his dignity.  
Robert C. Post writes of the concept of reputation as dignity, drawing on 
the sociological research of Erving Goffman to argue that dignity “is a 
ritual and ceremonial aspect of the self that we associate with the self’s 
integrity[.]”160  The observer of an exchange between a person and a 
                                                 
156 Heyman, supra note 16, at 1325. 
157 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 255 (Mary Gregor trans. 1991); see 
also Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American 
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 972 n.36 (citing Life Imprisonment Case, 45 
BVerfGE 187, 228 (1977), translated in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 314 (1994)); William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human 
Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47 
(Michael J. Meyer & W.A. Parent eds., 1992). 
158 Eberle, supra note 157, at 972. 
159 Id. at 1001. 
160 See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the 
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 708-10 (1986).  Post also described the concept of 
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speaker who speaks falsely about that person may have to choose which 
image—the true or the false—to believe.161  If the observer sides with the 
speaker, the person is discredited (literally, as far as creditworthiness is 
concerned).162  The person becomes subject to “‘exclusion from belonging 
as a respected and responsible’ member of society[,]” losing dignity.163  
Even where the false attribution of an action does not cause substantive 
harm to a person’s reputation, as Steven Heyman points out, it can 
“nevertheless violate her dignity as an autonomous being,” regardless of 
whether the specific item of information is derogatory or not, by treating 
that person as a “mere object rather than an active subject.”164  
However, the attribution of events to a person who did not do them 
injures dignity in a manner different from that of depersonalization, of 
person as object.  By falsely attributing an event to an actor, the 
attributor damages the individual’s right to self-determination by 
inflicting the consequences of the false attribution on the individual.  The 
individual may be denied the ability to have the same interactions with 
others that would otherwise be possible and the individual’s realm of 
choices may be unjustly circumscribed.  This is because others may 
choose to change their own course of action based on the false 
information, either choosing not to play with the misrepresented 
individual or by changing the terms on which they will play.  The 
individual’s ability to author his or her future is hampered by not his or 
her own past, but by that of someone else; personality as well as dignity 
is damaged.  However, the primary legal structures that exist to protect 
one’s reputation for purposes of participating in the marketplace do not 
sufficiently motivate data providers and aggregators to identify 
transactions more accurately, as discussed below. 
III.  THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT AND ITS FLAWS 
However much misattributed information may damage reputations, 
thereby inflicting not only tangible financial damage, but also damage to 
personality and dignity, victims of misattributed information have little 
                                                                                                             
reputation as property, earned through one’s own hard work, which is treated as a private 
good and accorded value by the market.  Id. at 693-99. 
161 Id. at 711. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. (quoting Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 303, 323 (1986)). 
164 Heyman supra note 16, at 1339.  Of course, if a false statement about someone does not 
cause injury to that person’s reputation, it is not defamatory.  Id.  Nonetheless, the 
statement may be actionable under the tort of false light invasion of privacy, which 
Heyman describes as “protecting the dignitary dimension of reputation.”  Id. 
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effective recourse for these injuries, despite the legal maxim ubi jus, ibi 
remedium, for every right there shall be a remedy.165  Protection of 
reputation was originally the province of common law, through the torts 
of defamation and false light.166  However, now the federal FCRA (or 
“the Act”) is the primary legal tool designed to promote the accuracy 
and integrity of transactional biographies, at least with respect to 
personal information used for credit, insurance, or employment 
purposes.   
But this Act inadequately protects individuals from the 
consequential and emotional damages caused by misattributed acts for 
several reasons.  First, it only imposes meaningful accuracy requirements 
on data providers and data aggregators after the false information has 
already been reported.167  Second, the Act overprotects data aggregators 
and providers by limiting private suits, preempting state laws, and 
giving qualified immunity from state torts to those who must comply 
with the Act.168  Though that qualified immunity mimics a privilege 
recognized widely at common law in defamation actions, courts have 
read the Act’s version with far too much deference to the industry’s 
interests, insufficiently valuing the impact bad information has on a 
modern consumer’s life. 
The FCRA was developed to solve the problem of misattributed 
information.  More than thirty-five years ago, once computers began to 
take over the chores of aggregating and sorting data, Congress began to 
recognize the power of widely available, aggregated data, the lack of 
power individuals had over the collection and use of such data, and the 
likelihood that some data could get assigned to the wrong person. 169  
                                                 
165 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1761 (8th ed. 1990). 
166 See W.S. Holdsworth, Defamation in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 40 L.Q. REV. 302, 303-05 
(1924) (discussing the development of defamation in the common law courts of England). 
167 See infra text accompanying notes 176-93. 
168 See infra text accompanying notes 235-39. 
169 One member of Congress expressed the fears of many: 
Undoubtedly the computerization of personal information about 
millions of individuals gives this subject greater importance and 
urgency then it had in the days when the average businessman knew 
his customers personally and knew the good credit risks from the bad, 
and the insurance agent was an old acquaintance who knew the 
probably good actuarial risks from the probably bad ones.  Today, 
such data is almost completely second hand, third hand or even more 
distant and impersonal, and it is almost impossible to find a human 
being to unravel a computer error once it’s made.  When the computer 
is half a continent away and connected to the store by electronics, the 
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Senator Proxmire, who led Congress in this reform effort, argued that 
“We certainly would not tolerate a Government agency depriving a 
citizen of his livelihood or freedom on the basis of unsubstantiated 
gossip without an opportunity to present his case.  And yet this is 
entirely possible on the part of a credit reporting agency.”170  Eventually 
Congress passed the original FCRA.171  However, the accuracy 
provisions of the Act and many courts’ interpretations of those 
provisions have not solved the problem of such “gossip” and have not 
kept up with modern information practices. 
Currently, the FCRA172 regulates the reporting of a broad category of 
records:  those that bear on an individual’s credit, character, general 
reputation, or personal characteristics,173 if an agency communicates the 
report for the purpose of determining a consumer’s eligibility for credit, 
insurance, or employment.174  Anyone with a business need for the 
information may obtain it.175  Given that so many transactions and so 
much detail about those transactions are being stored and analyzed, the 
volume of information subject to the Act expands every day.176 
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Accuracy Provisions  
The Act’s most significant flaw is that it imposes meaningful 
accuracy requirements only after a false and negative item has been 
reported, has already been put into the data sea.  However, given that 
                                                                                                             
remoteness of the customer from the real arbiter of his credit 
worthiness becomes even more pronounced. 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency 
on H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (remarks of Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan). 
170 115 CONG. REC. S2412 (1969) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).  The discussions around 
the Act also revealed some techno-phobia: 
with the trend toward . . . the establishment of all sorts of 
computerized data banks, the individual is in great danger of having 
his life and character reduced to impersonal “blips” and key-punch 
holes in a stolid and unthinking machine which can literally ruin his 
reputation without cause, and make him unemployable. 
116 CONG. REC. S36570 (1970) (remarks of Representative Sullivan).  Inaccurate and 
misleading information was seen as the most serious problem in the credit reporting 
industry, and the impact of even a small percentage of errors was recognized: “Everyone is 
a potential victim of an inaccurate credit report.  If not today, then perhaps tomorrow.”  115 
CONG. REC. S2411 (1969).  As Senator Proxmire noted, even a one percent error rate would 
lead to a million citizens having “reputations . . . unjustly maligned.”  Id. 
171 Pub. L. No. 91-508 (1970). 
172 FCRA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 (Dec. 4, 2003). 
173 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d). 
174 Id. §§ 1681(a)(d)(1)(A)-(B). 
175 Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(F). 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
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digitized data is far more available, accessible, duplicatable, and 
transmittable than old paper records, once a false record has been put 
into the data sea, it is very hard to ever completely cull it out. 
To provide an overview of the process regulated by the Act, as 
discussed above, a record of the sort covered by the Act generally 
originates with a business or governmental entity, which usually is the 
creator of an electronic record of a transaction, or at least maintains the 
record in that form.177  The business provides the information, along with 
identity markers for the responsible individual, to a data aggregator, 
called a consumer reporting agency in the Act.178  For example, a bank 
may report that a car loan belongs to the identified consumer and that 
the consumer has defaulted on it.  The aggregator, or agency, collects the 
information and warehouses it in vast databanks, ready to provide it to 
any customer who asks for it.   
The Act is designed to impose meaningful accuracy standards only 
after inaccurate information has already been provided by a data 
provider and reported by a data aggregator.  The Act permits the 
original data provider, called a furnisher under the Act, to furnish nearly 
any item in a consumer’s name without first verifying that it belongs to 
that consumer.179  But the Act only prohibits the furnisher from 
furnishing information that the furnisher either “knows or has 
reasonable cause to believe” to be inaccurate.180  A furnisher only has 
“‘reasonable cause to believe that an item of information is inaccurate’” if 
the furnisher has “specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the 
consumer, that would cause a reasonable person to have substantial 
doubts about the accuracy of the information.”181   
Although Congress supplemented the initial accuracy standard in 
2003 to prohibit a provider from furnishing information that a consumer 
has notified the provider to be inaccurate,182 the supplement is largely 
                                                 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23. 
178 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).  The FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency to be “any 
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly 
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer 
reports to third parties . . . .”  Id. 
179 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). 
180 Id. §§ 1681s-2(a)(1)(A), 1681s-2(a)(1)(D), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 312(b), 117 
Stat. 1952 (2003). 
181 Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(D), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 312(b), 117 Stat. 1952  (2003) 
(emphasis added). 
182 Id. § 1681 s-2(a)(1)(B), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 312(e), 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). 
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cosmetic because of the qualifications that undermine it.183  In any event, 
none of the standards imposed on data providers at the point of initially 
furnishing data are meaningful because Congress specifically prohibited 
injured consumers from the ability to enforce them.184 
Thus, the agency acquires information that likely has not been 
subjected to any scrutiny, let alone verified.  The agency acquires the 
information, either electronically or via magnetic tape from the provider, 
and stores it electronically, where it sits until needed for a report.  Just as 
the Act imposes a relatively weak accuracy requirement on data 
providers at the point of initial provision, the Act places only loose limits 
on aggregators that then report the information.  When a subscriber 
requests a report on a particular consumer, the aggregator, the consumer 
reporting agency, must only follow “reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy” of the information that it returns to the 
subscriber.185  The provision does not in fact require agencies to ensure 
the maximum possible accuracy of every item of information, or to do 
much if anything to match, verify, or cross-check the information.186  
Some courts have ruled that an agency need only look beneath the 
surface identification if it has reason to suspect the accuracy of a source 
of information.187  Furthermore, many courts have curtailed the effect of 
                                                 
183 Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B)(i).  The furnisher need only comply with this second accuracy 
obligation if the consumer notifies the furnisher at the furnisher’s designated address for 
such information.  Id.  The Act exempts furnishers from the obligation to avoid furnishing 
inaccurate information if the furnisher has specified to a consumer an address that the 
consumer can use to notify the furnisher that the information is inaccurate.  Id. § 1681s-
2(a)(1)(C).  However, the Act does not require furnishers to provide such an inaccuracy-
notice address.  Id.  A furnisher that learns that it has furnished inaccurate data about a 
consumer must also notify the agencies to which it has furnished the information of that 
knowledge and correct the inaccuracy.  Id. § 1681s-2(a)(2).  This requirement applies only to 
furnishers who furnish consumer information “regularly and in the ordinary course of 
business.”  Id. § 1681s-2(a)(2)(A). 
184 Id. § 1681s-2(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 312(e), 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). 
185 Id. § 1681e(b). 
186 FTC Official Staff Commentary § 607 item 3A, http://www.lawdog.com/CREDIT/ 
crta410.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007); see also Smith v. Auto Mashers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 
638, 641 (W.D. Va. 2000).  An agency does not violate this provision “simply by reporting 
an item of information that turns out to be inaccurate[,]” and dismissing the claim of the 
plaintiff, who was fired after an agency reported that he’d failed a drug screen, when in 
fact he had not.  Smith, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
187 See, e.g., Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., 257 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2001); Pinner 
v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 US. 1022 (1987) (where 
agency knew of personal dispute between consumer and person reporting the contested 
data to the agency, agency should not have relied on that person’s verification of the data 
once the consumer disputed it); Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Thomas v. Gulf Coast Credit Servs., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234-35 (M.D. Ala. 2002) 
(“blind reliance” on secondary sources that each offered the same inaccurate information 
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the accuracy requirement by incorporating a balancing test clearly not in 
the text of the Act, weighing “the potential that the information will 
create a misleading impression against the availability of more accurate 
[or complete] information and the burden of providing such 
information.”188  Between the provision itself and the interpretations of 
it, the Act signals to aggregators and furnishers that they can employ a 
default rule of merely passing through, unvetted, details about a 
transaction in a consumer’s name without fear of liability.   
It is only after an individual has learned that an agency has falsely 
charged him or her with negative data that the individual can require an 
aggregator to examine the data.  The maligned individual may demand 
that the agency “reinvestigate” the inaccurate information, a term in the 
Act that inaccurately suggests that the agency investigated the item to 
begin with.189  The agency then can choose between reinvestigating the 
information and deleting it.190  In fulfilling this accuracy obligation, the 
agency must make a good faith effort to determine the accuracy of the 
disputed item191—that is, the agency must do more than merely 
reconfirm, pro forma, the identity of the consumer with the business that 
originally provided the data.192  Thus, in theory, where another’s deeds 
are wrongly attributed to an individual, the agency must make a good 
                                                                                                             
about identity theft victim was not reasonable); Swoager v. Credit Bureau, 608 F. Supp. 972, 
974 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (merely parroting furnisher’s information did not meet agency’s 
obligation of reasonable reinvestigation). 
188 Koropoulous v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1984) (vacating summary 
judgment in favor of agency); Zotta v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1203 
(E.D. Mo. 2003) (agency must do more than simply correctly report the information given 
to it by the provider); see also Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (E.D. Mich. 1980) 
(holding that this provision may require an agency to keep track of the accuracy of its 
sources in order to prevent vaguely identified records from poisoning an individual’s file). 
189 15 U.S.C. § 1681e.  Presumably the term “reinvestigation” is used because the agency 
should have previously done some investigation in accepting the data to begin with, as 
required by § 1681e. 
190 Id. § 1681(a), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). 
191 F.T.C. Official Staff Commentary § 611 item 2, http://www.lawdog.com/CREDIT/ 
crta414.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
192 Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that 
agency may not merely rely on a creditor’s information when an identity theft victim 
challenged an account as not being his, and reversing lower court’s judgment for agency); 
Zala v. Trans Union, L.L.C., No. 3:99-CV-0399, 2001 WL 210693, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 
2001) (agency must inquire both of original creditor and of available public records).  A 
recent addition to the Act specifies that the agency’s reinvestigation must be “reasonable.”  
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2003), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 § 317, 117 Stat. 
1952 (2003). 
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faith effort to verify the attribution with the provider once the injured 
individual notifies the agency of the mismatch.193 
The language of the reinvestigation provision creates a vision of a 
thoughtful and professional clerk evaluating the consumer’s file in 
earnest consultation with the original data provider.  However, 
notwithstanding the responsibility, in fact the reinvestigation process is 
nearly as automated as the transmission of the original information to 
the agency.  The agency will usually send the provider a Consumer 
Dispute Verification form, whose automated form is known as an 
Automated Consumer Dispute Verification Form.194  This process 
reduces a defamed consumer’s anguished and detailed description of an 
error to a generalized code.195 
Once a data provider, a furnisher, receives this form, it must conduct 
a reasonable investigation of the inaccurate information.196  If the original 
                                                 
193 Cushman, 115 F.3d at 225; Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286-87 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
194 The Role of the FCRA in the Credit Granting Process Before the Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit, 108th Cong. 6 (2003) (statement of Harry Gambill, Chief 
Executive Officer, Trans Union, L.L.C.).  According to one representative of a national 
consumer reporting agency, 52% of its data providers use the automated consumer dispute 
verification system.  Id.; see also Anderson v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 345 F. Supp. 2d 963, 966-
67 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (describing automated process); McKeown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 335 
F. Supp. 2d 917, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (same); Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 306 F. 
Supp. 2d 873, 876-77 (D. Minn. 2004) (same). 
195 HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 98-99 (describing the verification process).  For example, 
in a case where an agency misattributed a report of death to the plaintiff, the agency sent 
an automated consumer dispute verification form with a two character code that produced 
an automatic written message, “‘special comment, compliance condition and/or remarks 
message disputed.  Consumer not liable for acct. (i.e., ex-spouse, business).  If liable 
provide complete ID and ECOA [Equal Credit Opportunity Act] code.’”  McKeown, 335 F. 
Supp. 2d at  926. 
196 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).  
The provider must reasonably investigate whether the provider can verify the item.  
Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting provider’s 
argument that the Act requires only a “minimal duty” to “briefly review” its records); see 
also Wade v. Equifax, No. 02-C-3205, 2003 WL 22089694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2003) 
(rejecting claim against provider who had reported an account opened by an identity thief 
as being the plaintiff’s, even though the plaintiff’s name, Lori Wade, differed substantially 
from the name the thief used, Lori White); Olwell v. Med. Info. Bureau, No. 01-1481 
JRTFLN, 2003 WL 79035, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2003) (denying provider’s motion for 
summary judgment where insurance company reported plaintiff as having failed a test that 
detected smoking on the grounds that the provider could be required to contact outside 
services to comply with its obligation to reinvestigate the information); Malm v. Household 
Bank (SB), N.A., No. 03-434OADMAJB, 2004 WL 1559370, at * 5 (D. Minn. July 7, 2004) 
(dismissing claim where provider did not learn that consumer’s wife had forged his 
signature on credit card); Agosta v. Inovision, Inc., No. 02-806, 2003 WL 22999213, at *5 
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provider cannot verify the item, the provider must “take steps to” 
modify, delete, or block the information.197  In theory, any 
mistranscription or misattribution error should be caught here, because 
an inaccurately attributed record would not be verifiable.  In any event, 
the provider must then notify the agency of the results of its 
investigation.198  Then the agency must not only notify the individual of 
the results of the search, but also the provider when the agency corrects 
or deletes inaccurate information as a result of the reinvestigation.199   
In 2003, as part of an overhaul of the Act, Congress took steps to 
curtail mismatching of information.200  However, instead of addressing 
the careless matching practices of providers and agencies that lead to so 
much poisoning of financial biographies, it focused on the subset of such 
information arising from identity theft.  Consumers may now require an 
agency to put a fraud alert in any report on the consumer.  The alerts 
also impose new responsibilities on users to verify the identity of anyone 
who applies for credit in the name of the victim.201  Furthermore, 
nationwide credit reporting agencies will have to block theft-related 
                                                                                                             
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2003); Betts v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135 
(W.D. Wash. 2003) (denying provider’s motion for summary judgment where furnisher, 
who sought to collect a debt incurred from towing an abandoned car, reported the debt as 
belonging to the plaintiff, although plaintiff had successfully claimed in different suit that 
she did not own the car); Kronstedt v. Equifax CSC, No. 01-C-0052-C, 2001 WL 34124783, at 
*7, *17 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 14. 2001) (denying provider’s motion for summary judgment where 
provider confirmed debt even though it had been notified that the plaintiff was a victim of 
identity theft); Bruce v. First U.S.A. Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1143-44 (E.D. Mo. 2000) 
(denying provider’s motion for summary judgment where provider had reported a card 
taken out by the plaintiff’s ex-wife as belonging to plaintiff, even though he had repeatedly 
notified the issuer of the fraud and the provider’s own investigation showed that the 
signatures on the account application did not match plaintiff’s). 
197 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E).  The provider need only do this for the purpose of 
reporting information to the agency.  Id. 
198 Id. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(C). 
199 Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 314(a), 117 Stat. 1995 (2003). 
200 Id. § 1681c-1 (Supp. III 2003); see also 16 C.F.R § 603.2 (2006) (defining the terms 
“identity theft” and “identifying information”). 
201 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(h)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2003), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 112, 117 
Stat. 1955 (2003).  The Act as amended also requires businesses that have done business 
with an identity thief in the victim’s name to provide the victim with information about the 
transaction, such as providing the victim with the thief’s credit application.  Id., added by 
Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 151, 117 Stat. 1961 (2003).  However, the business does not become 
obligated to cooperate until the victim has proven his or her own identity to the business’s 
satisfaction.  See id. § 1681g(e)(2).  The irony being, of course, that if the business had 
demanded appropriate identification of the thief’s identity, the victim would likely not 
have become a victim.  Id. 
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debts from their files.202  Once a consumer submits an identity theft 
report to a provider of bad data, the provider must cease furnishing the 
fraudulent information in the victim’s name unless the provider 
subsequently “knows” that the information is correct.203  These 
provisions have the same flaw as the general accuracy provisions that 
apply to ordinary data:  they focus on the time after a data provider and 
data aggregator have already attributed the thief’s information to the 
victim, after the digitized records have been reported. 
In short, the tepid standards that govern the initial provision of 
information to aggregators and to those aggregators’ subscribers give 
data providers and aggregators a free bite of the apple.  They can sort of 
shoot haphazardly for accuracy without having to take steps to target it.  
Thus, the Act in practice has not effectively filtered bad information from 
the pool of consumer data, nor has it protected consumers from the 
harmful effects of such data.204  The most meaningful accuracy check—
the reinvestigation required of agencies and providers—does not arise 
until after a consumer challenges a piece of misattributed information.  
Realistically a consumer is not going to learn that an aggregator has 
distorted the consumer’s biography with a mismatched record until the 
aggregator has reported the item to a third party, a third party who is 
likely checking the individual’s biography to determine the individual’s 
worthiness for a particular benefit.  Thus, a consumer has to suffer the 
reporting of false information before being entitled to any review of the 
substance of the information.  By that time, the consumer may well have 
suffered consequences to finances and to personal dignity that cannot 
necessarily be undone.  In the fictional example described above, Charlie 
would suffer the loss of a mortgage and possibly even a job itself.  He 
could be denied insurance, and may even be arrested, all before being 
                                                 
202 Id. § 1681c-2(a) (Supp. III 2003), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 152(a), 117 Stat. 1964 
(2003).  The agency must notify the provider of the blocked information that it may have 
arisen from an identity theft.  Id. § 1681c-2(b)(1).  Once notified, the data provider must 
implement procedures to prevent them from re-providing the information.  Id. § 1681s-
2(a)(6), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 154, 117 Stat. 1966 (2003).  Although the Act allows 
the agency to unblock the information under certain circumstances, the agency must notify 
the consumer that it is doing so.  Id. § 1681c-2(c)(2), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 152, 117 
Stat. 1964 (2003). 
203 Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B) (Supp. III 2003), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 154, 117 Stat. 1952 
(2003).  The Act as revised by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003), also requires a furnisher to put in place reasonable 
procedures to respond to any notice that it receives from a consumer reporting agency that 
a consumer has blocked identified information from the consumer’s report as resulting 
from identity theft.  Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(A), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 154 (2003). 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 61-63. 
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able to compel the data aggregator and the data provider to correct the 
mismatch, to get them to disconnect him from the discrediting act. 
A misattribution may prevent the consumer from being able to fully 
participate in the marketplace at a critical time in that consumer’s life.205  
By the time the consumer learns of the error, not only has his reputation 
been wrecked by the false information, the attribution of that 
information to him has hampered his ability to live his life forward 
based on his past.  By delaying its meaningful accuracy test, the Act 
allows agencies and furnishers a free pass that can be painfully costly to 
the defamed consumer. 
Such weak protections from mismatched information might have 
been appropriate in 1970 when the FCRA was first enacted.206  At that 
time, many records would have been on paper and reported on tape.  
Though computerization did motivate Congress to enact the legislation, 
data technology was still in its infancy and the Internet was largely just a 
gleam in the eyes of a few dreamers.207  A free bite of the apple of 
inaccuracy may have been justified then, as so many errors could only 
have been caught through the painstaking process of human visual 
inspection.   
Courts, however, continue to interpret the Act as if the records were 
arduously searched by hand, rather than easily by machine, and construe 
the already mild obligation of agencies to use “‘reasonable procedures to 
assure maximum possible accuracy’” before initially reporting a negative 
item in a consumer’s name in ways that wholly fail to promote 
identification accuracy.208  Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 209 and Sarver v. 
Experian Information Solutions,210 both from the Seventh Circuit, exemplify 
the stale application of analog standards of recklessness.  In Crabill, the 
defendant, a national consumer reporting agency, repeatedly 
misattributed to the plaintiff information about transactions belonging to 
                                                 
205 See CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY, supra note 86.  One study found, for example, that such 
exclusions from commerce are particularly likely to happen during period of heavy 
volume, such as when interest rates provoke a rash of refinancings.  Id. 
206 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 2413(a)(2), 110 
Stat. 3009 (1996).  Standards for furnishers were not imposed until 1996.  Id. 
207 See The Internet: A Short History of Getting Connected, www.fcc.gov/omd/history/ 
intenet/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
208 Sarver v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004); Crabill v. Trans 
Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2001). 
209 259 F.3d at 663. 
210 390 F.3d at 972. 
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the plaintiff’s brother.211  The agency did so even though the brothers 
had different first names (John versus Jerry) and different social security 
numbers.212  Their dates of birth, a piece of data that individuals do not 
often mistake, were thirteen months apart.213  Given this knowledge, the 
agency’s attribution of both sets of records to the plaintiff not only 
overlooked the possibility of harm, but rashly ignored it.  In the parlance 
of this Article, the agency used fuzzy matching.214   
Nonetheless, Judge Posner, writing for the unanimous panel, 
excused the misattribution, noting that not only did the first names begin 
with the same letter, but that the brothers’ social security numbers 
differed by just one number.215  The court agreed with the agency that 
someone could have mistranscribed the names and number, which could 
lead to the possibility that the transactions involved could in fact have 
been incurred by either brother.216  This possibility, according to the 
court, justified the mismatching.217  Although the court acknowledged 
that Trans Union could have programmed its computer differently to 
match less loosely, it condoned the oversized net Trans Union used to 
pull the plaintiff’s information from its databases, finding that the 
agency could reasonably report the transactions of both brothers as those 
of each one individually.218  
The Crabill decision permits data aggregators a level of imprecision 
that conflicts with day-to-day experience in the modern digital world, as 
opposed to the old analog one.  Most of us are accustomed to making 
exacting matches between strings of characters.  We expect that if we 
miss one digit of a PIN, transpose two characters of a password, or skip 
one numeral in an account number, access will be denied.  Instead of 
requiring that level of exactitude that is routine in our digital, character-
string-driven world, the Crabill court essentially allowed the defendant 
to play by 1970 capability rules.  As a result, each brother was denied the 
right to be judged by his own biography and, instead, must submit to 
being judged based on deeds done by another.  The plaintiff lost control 
over the image of his personality presented to others. 
                                                 
211 259 F.3d at 663. 
212 Id. 
213 Supplemental Brief of Appellee at *2, Crabill v. Trans Union Corp., No. 00-2078, 2001 
WL 34105114 (7th Cir. June 18, 2001). 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 139-43. 
215 Crabill, 259 F.3d at 663. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id.  The court affirmed summary judgment for the agency on the plaintiff’s FCRA 
claim.  Id. at 667. 
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The Crabill court was persuaded by the aggregator’s justification for 
fuzzy matching, that it increases accuracy by scooping up records 
actually attributable to the targeted individual, but that fail to precisely 
match the individual’s identity markers because someone—the original 
recorder or the individual—mistranscribed one or more markers.  
However, aggregators that employ fuzzy matching for that reason could 
come even closer to their goal of a full and accurate portrayal of the 
person by cross-checking that pool of records against known matches, a 
task that would have been a great burden in the early days of the Act, 
but which would likely take nothing but a tweak of the existing 
algorithms and nanoseconds of computer time now.  By overlooking all 
the benefits of modern data technology that allowed the agency to traffic 
in the mismatched records, the court failed to accord the benefits of that 
technology to the misportrayed consumer. 
Cross-checking can also prevent misattribution by undermatching, 
where a record with identifying information insufficient to pinpoint it to 
a specific individual is tagged to the wrong person.  An aggregator can 
compare the record with other information more closely matched to the 
individual, which can reveal an inconsistency that the aggregator should 
resolve before reporting any, especially negative, information.  For 
example, a record of an account opened in 1965 should not be matched 
to an individual not born until four years later, regardless of the 
similarity between the names.219  But internal inconsistencies can be 
more subtle.  For instance, if an aggregator has a bankruptcy filing 
record with one person’s name, the aggregator could check additional 
matching data before attributing it to the identity of a person who has 
the same name, but whose other records show minimal debt.220  A report 
that differs substantially from one issued the previous month,221 or is 
derogatory when previously the subject had an “excellent business and 
social reputation,”222 should raise the need for additional verification.223  
One should be accountable for what one already knows and not hurt 
someone’s reputation by disregarding that knowledge. 
                                                 
219 Sheffer v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 02-7407, 2003 WL 21710573, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
July 24, 2003). 
220 Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The court ruled that 
reporting such a record notwithstanding this sort of inconsistency could be unreasonable.  
Id. at 51-52 (interpreting the FCRA). 
221 Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 77-78 (6th Cir. 1982). 
222 Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 88 (Ct. App. 1975) (upholding jury’s 
finding that agency acted with malice). 
223 Id. 
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Notwithstanding the advances in data technology, courts have 
generally held that agencies need not review a report for such 
inconsistencies before issuing it.  For example, in Sarver v. Experian 
Information Solutions, another Seventh Circuit opinion, the court rejected 
the claim of an individual to whom the agency had wrongly attributed 
the bankruptcy of another.224  The court approved of an agency’s 
mismatch of accounts that referred to a bankruptcy filing to the plaintiff, 
even though only those accounts, and no others associated with that 
plaintiff, were listed as having been “involved in bankruptcy.”225  
Furthermore, the agency had not received any information of a 
bankruptcy judgment in the plaintiff’s name.226   
The plaintiff argued that given that only one set of accounts was 
involved in bankruptcy, in contrast to the many healthy accounts 
attributed to the plaintiff, the inconsistency should have alerted the 
agency to its attribution error, but the court disagreed.227  In justifying 
the agency’s failure to resolve the anomalies within the records 
attributed to the plaintiff, the court emphasized the 200 million names 
and addresses, the 2.6 billion trade lines, and the complexity of the 
system.228  This reasoning overlooks that the very complexity of the 
system reveals the ability of the agency to control the high volume of 
individuals and records, and that ability should alert the agency to the 
high risk of misattributing information.  The court ruled that the 
agency’s failure to investigate the inconsistency was not unreasonable 
because the agency had no notice that the specific lender who had 
provided information about the impaired accounts was unreliable.229  
However, the question, in order to protect individuals from reckless 
attribution, should not be whether any single provider is unreliable.  The 
question should have been whether reporting it as the plaintiff’s without 
checking it, given the obvious inconsistency, was reckless.  Where the 
agency was aware of the risk of misattribution from fuzzy matching, and 
that matching produced a record that was unlike the others, a jury 
should decide whether the failure to take any steps to verify the 
anomalous data breached the FCRA’s accuracy standard.  
The Sarver court also reasoned that to require an agency to further 
investigate the accuracy of a consumer’s records when an anomaly 
                                                 
224 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
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appeared would impose “enormous” increased costs.230  However, the 
court did not refer to any estimate of the costs or explain why an already 
complex system capable of making many comparisons among different 
records could not inexpensively adjust to cross-checking data when 
reliability was at issue.  Furthermore, when an anomaly appears that 
would work to the consumer’s detriment, an agency could simply 
decline to attribute the negative data should it not want to take the extra 
effort of verifying it.  The decision allows the agency all of the benefits of 
its database technology with none of the responsibilities. 
Similar to the court’s disregard of the sort of precise matching 
expected in most non-face-to-face transactions today, this reasoning is 
out of date.  The Crabill court should have understood that if the agency 
is able to “process[ ] over 50 million updates to trade information each 
day,”231 it has the capability to analyze data and to do so quickly.  The 
high-volume excuse may have been appropriate in an analog world, 
where the agencies relied on physical pieces of information that required 
a human being, rather than a computer, to read and understand them.  
Human beings read slowly, compared with computers, and make 
mistakes.  However, the justification is no longer appropriate where a 
computer can quickly compare individual records for consistency.  The 
Sarver court’s construction ignores that the very technological tools that 
allow an agency to assemble a list of events for any one consumer can be 
tightened to cross-check for just such a discrepancy.  The speed, storage 
capacities, and analytical capabilities of modern data processing systems 
rob a great deal of the wonder from the process.  As mentioned above, 
Experian advertises that it maintains more than 65 terabytes—65 trillion 
bytes—of data on North American consumers and business.232  The very 
fact that the agency is capable of those kinds of numbers shows the 
power it has over its data, as do the products the agencies market.233  If 
the agency can harness that power for the benefit of data users, it should 
be able to direct it to the benefit of those individuals whose events give 
rise to the agency’s income. 
Not only do these decisions fail to recognize the aggregators’ 
capacity to control data, they fail to reflect an understanding of the 
power of a bad biography in a modern, data-driven world.  The stamina, 
accessibility, and duplicatability of all data and, for purposes of this 
                                                 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 47-58. 
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discussion, bad data, give it much more power over the persons to 
whom it pertains than when such data was more functionally obscure.234  
To return to our fictional individual, once the calumny to Charlie 
Consumer is digitized, it is almost irreversible.  Other aggregators will 
pick it up, store it, and report it.  Users who would once not have sought 
such detailed information now will request reports and store the false 
information in Charlie’s name.  When challenged, the provider and 
aggregator may insist on attributing Charley’s misdeeds to Charlie, and 
courts may hold that they can do so without violating the federal act 
intended to cleanse this sort of gossip out of the information sea.  The 
original consumer’s reputation, built as it is from a false image, will 
suffer among a much wider audience. 
This power to cripple consumers’ abilities to participate in standard 
life activities justifies a much higher standard of accuracy, not a lower 
one.  This higher standard should arise at the initial reporting of negative 
information.  Given the potential that a mismatched record has to 
disrupt someone’s life, data providers and aggregators should ensure 
that a “digital dossier” contains only those events in which that 
individual actually participated.   
B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Protection of Mismatchers 
The FCRA is an unsatisfactory means for consumers to protect 
themselves from defamation not just because it imposes weak standards 
that several court decisions have further enfeebled.  Even where a data 
provider or aggregator fails to meet the Act’s standards, the Act protects 
them from the consequences in three ways: by prohibiting private suits 
for many infractions, by immunizing those in the consumer data 
industry from most state claims, and by preempting state laws that 
would require greater accuracy and accountability.235  However, 
allowing those in the consumer data industry to traffic in information 
without fearing liability diminishes accuracy and may discourage data 
providers and aggregators from finding and using the sort of technology 
that would scrub misidentified events from the databases.  Although 
some of these protections may have been justified in the nascent world of 
computerized records when Congress first enacted the Act, the last two 
major revisions to the Act have extended protections to private-sector 
aggregators even though technology justifies increasing liability instead. 
                                                 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 131-36. 
235 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (providing qualified immunity); id. § 1681s-2(c) (eliminating 
private causes of action for designated violations); id. § 1681t(b) (preempting designated 
state laws). 
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1. Limits on Private Suits 
The aggregators garner, aggregate, and regurgitate information 
provided to them by their providers, the businesses that record their 
transactions with individuals.  Thus, these providers’ errors in 
furnishing data on a consumer will lead directly to inaccurate 
information disseminated by the agency.  However, the rights that these 
FCRA provisions give with one hand they take away with another.  The 
Act specifically provides that its civil claim sections236 may not be used to 
enforce the obligation of providers to withhold information that they 
“know[ ] or ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe” is inaccurate, regardless 
of how egregiously a provider violates the provision.237  Only designated 
federal agencies and state officials may enforce these rights.238  
Accordingly, without the sort of determined agency action that has not 
yet been forthcoming, the Act will do little to motivate data providers 
from taking care to match records of events with their doers.   
Now, the Act allows consumers to enforce one accuracy provision 
against those data providers who attribute an event to the wrong 
consumer.239  This provision, arising only after the provider has already 
                                                 
236 Id. §§ 1681n-o (titled civil liability for willful noncompliance and civil liability for 
negligent noncompliance, respectively).  The FCRA allows punitive damages if an actor 
“willfully” violates its responsibilities under the Act. Id. § 1681n(a).  To show willful 
noncompliance, a plaintiff must show that a defendant “knowingly and intentionally 
committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others, but need not show malice 
or evil motive.”  Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Sapia v. Regency Motors, 276 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Northrop v. Hoffman of Simsbury, Inc., 12 Fed. Appx. 44, 50 (2d Cir. June 14, 2001); 
Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 1997); Philbin v. Trans Union 
Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 970 (3d Cir. 1996); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022 (1987); Yohay v. City of Alexandria Employees Credit 
Union, Inc., 827 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1987); Hurocy v. Direct Merch. Credit Card Bank, 
N.A., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (denying summary judgment for 
defendant, which plaintiff alleged had furnished inaccurate information about the plaintiff 
to credit reporting agencies). 
237 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(a), (c)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1966 (2003). 
238 Id. § 1681s-2(d), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1966 (2003).  Courts have 
upheld this immunity.  See, e.g., Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 
1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing dismissal of claim).  But see Geeslin v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., No. 1:97CV186-DA, 1998 WL 433932, at *5 (N.D. Miss. June 3, 1988) 
(denying provider’s motion to dismiss § 1681s-2(a) claims against it with no reference to 
the explicit statutory provision). 
239 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1); see also Nelson, 282 F.3d at 1059-60 (reversing dismissal of 
consumer’s action); Scott v. Amex/Centurion S&T, No. 3:01-CV-1594-H, 2001 WL 1645362, 
at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2001) (accepting magistrate’s conclusion of law that consumer’s 
complaint be dismissed with prejudice); Thomasson v. Bank One, La., N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 
721, 723 (E.D. La. 2001) (denying provider’s motion to dismiss); Mandly v. Bank One 
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misattributed an event to an individual, requires furnishers who have 
received a notice from a consumer reporting agency that a consumer has 
disputed the completeness or accuracy of consumer data, to investigate 
the dispute and modify, block, or delete the information if the furnisher 
cannot verify its accuracy.240  However, furnishers only become subject 
to that provision after the aggregator has already attributed the bad data 
to the individual and reported the attribution to a third party.  By that 
point, the consumer has lost dignity and his rightful reputation.  That is, 
the bad data has already been put into the sea of information, from 
where, given the duplicatability of electronic records, it may be 
impossible for the consumer to retrieve and remediate it.   
2. Preemption of State Laws 
The FCRA fails to protect individuals’ reputations by allowing 
providers and aggregators to misattribute information and immunizing 
them from state action except where a plaintiff can show malice.  In 
addition, it further exposes people to a high risk of digital defamation by 
preempting many state laws that would otherwise provide an avenue of 
recourse to those who suffered from an unearned reputation tainted by 
the deeds of another. 
By its express language, the general preemption rule under the Act 
provides that the Act does not preempt state law claims.241  However, in 
                                                                                                             
Dayton, No. 99-1358-PHX-RGS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16269, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2000) 
(same); McMillan v. Experian Info. Servs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D. Conn. 2000); 
Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Ryan v. Trans 
Union Corp., No. 99-C-216, 2000 WL 110040, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2000); Whitesides v. 
Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 807, 812-13 (W.D. La. 2000) (denying 
provider’s motion for summary judgment); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 99-
1699(DWF/AJB), 2000 WL 33956225, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 17, 2000); Thompson v. Elec. 
Transaction Corp., No. 1:98CV305-P-B, 2000 WL 33907674, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2000); 
Olexy v. Interstate Assurance Co., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047-48 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Bruce v. 
First U.S.A. Nat’l Ass’n, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (denying, in part, 
provider’s motion to dismiss); DiMezza v. First USA Bank, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 
(D.N.M. 2000) (same); Campbell v. Baldwin, 90 F. Supp. 2d 754, 756 (E.D. Tex. 2000) 
(denying motion to dismiss); Brown v. Maine Med. Ctr., No. 98-444-P-C, 1999 WL 
33117137, at *3 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 1999) (magistrate’s recommendation to deny motion to 
dismiss).  But see Carney v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1999) (holding no private cause of action to enforce data provider’s reinvestigation 
responsibilities, using an implausible construction of the provision). 
240 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1954 (2003). 
241 Id. § 1681t(a) (Supp. III 2003).  Section 1681t(a) provides as follows: 
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, this 
subchapter does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person subject 
to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of 
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an example of the exceptions swallowing the rule, the FCRA lists several 
specific preemption provisions that override any state “requirement or 
prohibition” bearing a designated degree of similarity to the federal 
provision, regardless of whether the state law is inconsistent or provides 
the consumer greater protection.242  For example, the Act preempts all 
state requirements or prohibitions relating to the subject matter of all of 
the responsibilities of data providers to furnish accurate information and 
to reinvestigate information contested as inaccurate.243 
As discussed above,244 the one type of misattribution that Congress 
directly addressed is that arising from identity theft.245  However, 
Congress specifically preempted state laws that address the same 
conduct as the identity theft provisions of the Act.246  Thus, the Act 
drastically limits the ability of states to control how data aggregators and 
their clients must respond to identity theft.247 
3. Qualified Immunity from State Common Law Torts 
The right to redress for someone’s false report of an act has 
traditionally been in tort, the province of state law.  Not only does the 
FCRA and interpreting case law drain its own effectiveness by voiding 
many private actions against data providers, it also seeks to sweep away 
state common law causes of action that protect the dignity and integrity 
of individuals’ reputations.  The FCRA limits certain state common law 
                                                                                                             
any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any 
information on consumers, or for the prevention or mitigation of 
identity theft, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with 
any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the 
inconsistency. 
Id.  The exceptions in subsections (b) and (c) are discussed below, infra notes 242-46. 
242 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b) (Supp. III 2003).  Prior to the 2003 revisions to the Act, the then-
existing preemption provisions were due to expire on January 1, 2004, 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(d) 
(2000), and it was that pending expiration that motivated Congress to act not only to 
enshrine the provisions but greatly expand them.  Id.; see also Hendricks, supra note 39, at 
337-65 (describing the intense lobbying efforts of the financial services industry). 
243 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-159 (2003).  However, the Act 
preserves actions brought pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 54A(a); and CAL. CIVIL 
CODE § 1785.25(a), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Consumer Credit Reporting 
Reform Act of 1996.  Id. 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 73-79. 
245 See supra text accompanying notes 73-79. 
246 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(5)(B)-(C), added by Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 711, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003). 
247 Id. § 1681t(b)(5).  Among the new duties of agencies that are related to identity theft 
and that are now preempted are those in sections 1681c-1 (identity theft prevention; fraud 
alerts and active duty alerts) and 1681c-2 (block of information resulting from identity 
theft).  Id. 
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tort actions by victims of false reports, immunizing data aggregators, 
users, and providers from any action “in the nature of defamation, 
invasion of privacy, or negligence” based on information disclosed 
pursuant to the Act,248 unless the plaintiff proves that the “false 
information [was] furnished with malice or willful intent to injure” the 
plaintiff.249   
Congress imposed this limitation as a quid pro quo for the Act’s 
requirements that agencies disclose to consumers the information that 
they reported on them.250  Thus, the qualified immunity provision 
should not completely shield data providers and aggregators from the 
designated causes of action.  It merely raises the level of proof required 
of a consumer who brings a defamation, privacy, or negligence action 
against an agency or a furnisher.  Consumers will be more likely to be 
able to show “malice”251 than “willful intent to injure.”252  So, what does 
“malice” mean for purposes of the Act?  Courts have largely adopted the 
same standard issued by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, which held that the First Amendment requires a public figure in 
a defamation action to show that the publisher of a false story published 
                                                 
248 Id. § 1681h(e) (2000).  The provision in its entirety states as follows: 
(e)  Limitation of liability 
Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no 
consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of 
defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence with respect to the 
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency, any 
user of information, or any person who furnishes information to a 
consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant 
to section 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information 
disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against 
whom the user has taken adverse action, based in whole or in part on 
the report except as to false information furnished with malice or 
willful intent to injure such consumer. 
Id. 
249 Id.  The qualified immunity provided by the Act applies only if the consumer 
discovered the information through a disclosure mandated by the Act.  Id. 
250 See Hearings on S. 823 Before Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the Senate Banking & Currency 
Comm., 91st Cong. 71 (1969).  Senator Proxmire, the bill’s primary sponsor, originally 
intended to preserve traditional state law remedies for false information.  Id. at 24.  
However, to assuage industry concerns that the Act’s required disclosures would release a 
barrage of lawsuits against agencies and their furnishers—a fear that perhaps reflected the 
unease of the industry with the accuracy of its data—Senator Proxmire proposed the 
limited immunity.  Id. at 104.  Consumer advocates strenuously opposed this bargain.  See 
also Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 1980); Yeager v. TRW, Inc., 984 F. 
Supp. 517, 522 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (noting bargain); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. 
Supp. 577, 584 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
251 See infra Part IV.A. 
252 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). 
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false information with the knowledge that the information is false or 
with reckless disregard of its truthfulness.253  To prove reckless 
disregard, some have stated that the plaintiff must show that the speaker 
“entertained actual doubt” about the truthfulness of the statement.254 
As further discussed below, the power of disconnected data on 
individuals and the capabilities of information technology are such that 
much misattribution of data arises from just such “reckless disregard” of 
the truth.255  That courts have adopted this standard for purposes of the 
FCRA’s qualified immunity provision does not indicate that the standard 
is required by the Constitution; the Supreme Court made that clear in 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,256 where it held that 
mere negligence sufficed to impose liability on a consumer reporting 
agency that published false information.257   
In short, while appearing to protect consumers, the Act protects 
those who tarnish consumers’ reputations by attributing the acts of 
another to the consumer.  The Act denies those individuals the ability to 
enforce many of the Act’s own accuracy provisions, while at the same 
time providing qualified immunity from state causes of action that might 
arise from the agency’s mishandling.  Simultaneously, the Act wholly 
bars states from protecting their citizens from much of the damage bad 
data can do, explicitly claiming a monopoly on much of the territory.  
The showy substance of the 2003 amendments, which emphasize 
furnisher responsibility and the consequences of identity theft, may have 
distracted us from the impotent enforcement powers and the preemption 
                                                 
253 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).  Cases applying this standard include Cousin v. Trans Union 
Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 376 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating judgment for the plaintiff); Rhodes v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 951 F.2d 905, 906-07 (8th Cir. 1991) (granting creditor’s motion for 
summary judgment where creditor was merely negligent in falsely reporting that borrower 
had defaulted on her car loan payments); Thornton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F.2d 700, 705 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (citing standard as “an example of a type of malice necessary to overcome a 
qualified privilege”); Gordon v. Greenpoint Credit, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (S.D. Iowa 
2003); Bruce v. First U.S.A. Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Yeager v. 
TRW Inc., 984 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 213, 
223 (D.D.C. 1993); Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 819 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Idaho 1991). 
254 See, e.g., Bruce, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (granting summary judgment to furnisher who 
had reported a fraudulent account as belonging to the plaintiff); Wiggins, 848 F. Supp. at 
223. 
255 Bruce, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. 
256 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
257 Id. at 795.  The FCRA’s qualified immunity provision did not raise the plaintiff’s level 
of proof because the plaintiff was a commercial enterprise, and accordingly the Act did not 
apply to the defendant’s report.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(c)-(d) (Supp. III 2003) (defining a 
consumer report as pertaining to a consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance, 
employment, and other designated transactions defining a consumer as an individual). 
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of state laws.  Nonetheless, some arenas of traditional relief may still 
exist, as discussed below. 
IV.  REVIVING THE COMMON LAW TORT OF DEFAMATION TO PROTECT 
INDIVIDUALS’ REPUTATIONS, PERSONALITIES, AND DIGNITY 
When the aggregator- and provider-friendly interpretations of the 
FCRA’s accuracy provisions are paired with the qualified immunity 
provisions and state law preemption provisions, arguably the Act 
becomes not a consumer protection act, but rather a data provider and 
data aggregator protection act.  Individuals cannot depend upon the Act 
to protect their reputations, even though the power of data aggregators 
to assemble data about (or purportedly about) consumers has swelled, 
and that data has more power over individuals’ lives than ever.  State 
tort law, then, could be a viable alternative.  After all, historically, tort 
law has been the source of remedies for damage done by bad 
information.258  Furthermore, defamation, a word that derives from a 
Latin phrase meaning to spread rumor by false report, far more closely 
identifies the injury misattribution does to a person’s dignity and 
reputation than does the sterile-sounding “Fair Credit Reporting Act.”   
The two torts designed to protect reputation are defamation and the 
privacy tort of false light.  Defamation is a communication that “tends so 
to harm the reputation of another as to lower [that person] in the 
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with [that person].”259  The tort of false light, one of the four 
privacy torts classified by Dean Prosser,260 provides redress against one 
who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other 
before the public in a false light, if that false light would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and the publisher either knew that the 
matter was false or acted in reckless disregard as to the matter’s falsity.261  
These torts are the historical avenues of redress for those whose 
reputations are poisoned by those who misattribute transactions 
mismatched to individuals.  In contrast to the FCRA, they do not offer a 
free pass to the misattributors.  However, as discussed above, the FCRA 
                                                 
258 See Sheffer v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 02-7407, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12728, 
at *14 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2003) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on credit 
defamation claim).  A false statement in a credit report can be defamatory if it tends to 
deter others from dealing with the plaintiff.  Id. 
259 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
260 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977). 
261 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
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tries to deter defamed individuals from availing themselves of these torts 
by offering data aggregators and data providers qualified immunity 
from them, and overly-expansive readings of that protection has led to 
the “frothy Chaos” of rumor and gossip clogging databases now.  
However, an appropriate reading of the qualified immunity provision, 
one that comports with modern access to and use of technology, could 
make these torts meaningful tools with which to clean up corrupted data 
and motivate actors to verify the information that they put into the data 
sea.  
Traditionally, false light has protected a person’s right to be let 
alone, while defamation has protected people’s interests in their 
reputations.262  But defamation protects not just the reputation of a 
person, but also the right to dignity by protecting one’s interest in being 
included within the portion of society that is worthy of respect.263 
Falsely connecting the act of one to the identity of another not only 
injures the reputation of the one stuck with the act, it violates that 
person’s personhood and injures that person’s dignity.264  A flawed 
digital image that includes the events not wholly of one’s making inflicts 
the sort of damage to dignity that defamation law seeks to protect.265  
That injury occurs even if the misattributed information is not 
derogatory.  Defamation protects “the manner in which the image of the 
self is constructed in the social realm.”266  
Though the FCRA federalized the law governing credit reports, 
states continue to have a strong interest in protecting the reputation and 
dignity of their citizens through common law torts such as defamation, a 
principle repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court.  In Gertz v. Welch, 
the Court underscored “the compensation of individuals for the harm 
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood” as a “legitimate state 
interest.”267  Given that interest, the Court “would not lightly require the 
State to abandon this purpose.”268  The decision quoted the following 
words of Justice Stewart: 
                                                 
262 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 864 (W. Page Keeton, ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
263 Id. 
264 See supra text accompanying notes 155-63. 
265 Heyman, supra note 16, at 1339. 
266 Id. 
267 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). 
268 Id. 
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[T]he individual’s right to the protection of his own 
good name “reflects no more than our basic concept of 
the essential dignity and worth of every human being—
a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty.  The protection of private personality, like the 
protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual 
States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  But 
this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less 
recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional 
system.”269  
Notwithstanding the relevance of both torts, defamation is focused 
on here because, as a general rule, the tort of false light publicity will not 
help an individual who has suffered from misattributed information 
because disclosures among those involved in a financial or personal 
transaction will generally not meet the tort’s publicity element.270  
Furthermore, not every state recognizes a cause of action for false light 
invasion of privacy—in part because of its very overlap with the tort of 
defamation.271  Even under the tort of defamation, however, a defamed 
consumer must still contend with a common law qualified privilege that 
benefits those who report financial information of others.  Once that is 
done, however, defamation can impose liability for the initial wrongful 
reporting of information, which can help motivate the data industry to 
prevent mismatched information from entering the flow of transmittable 
data.  
                                                 
269 Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
270 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.  The Restatement defines “publicity” 
as meaning “that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or 
to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one 
of public knowledge.”  Id.; see, e.g., Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 
(10th Cir. 1985) (disclosure of plaintiffs’ inaccurate credit report to subscribers did not meet 
element).  However, as electronically-stored information grows increasingly accessible, 
victims of misattribution may be able to meet this element.  Polin, 768 F.2d at 1206-07. 
271 See, e.g., Elm Med. Lab., Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989), 
abrogated in part on other grounds by United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20 
(Mass. 1990); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998); Sullivan v. 
Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 481 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Howell v. New York Post, 
Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 
405, 413 (N.C. 1984); Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 669-670 (Ohio 1983); Brown 
v. Pearson, 483 S.E.2d 477, 484 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 
579-80 (Tex. 1994); Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Wis. 1989). 
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A. Defamation’s Qualified Privilege and the Existing Construction of Malice 
1. The Development of the Privilege, Its Mixed Acceptance, and Its 
Incorporation into the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Defamation was once a viable tool for those defamed by the earliest 
forms of data aggregators in the modern age—credit agencies.  
Nonetheless, those agencies were not strictly liable for false information, 
nor were they usually even liable for negligence.  Rather, the common 
law allowed them a qualified privilege of malice.272  In this way, the 
FCRA did not, at least with respect to this one tort, change the common 
law dramatically by offering aggregators, providers, and users qualified 
immunity from defamation.273  Courts developed the privilege to protect 
those merchants who did a credit business and who needed to know 
who in their community paid promptly.  To protect this need to share 
information, communications on the subject are privileged if made in 
good faith.  Therefore, in those states that recognize the privilege, a party 
whose reputation is injured by such a communication must prove actual 
malice.274  Eventually commercial agencies took over the business of 
aggregating credit information and the privilege followed them.275 
However, not every jurisdiction hands this shield to credit reporting 
agencies.  Some prefer to protect the reputations of individuals from 
false information.  In a decision that assigned decidedly more weight to 
the dignity of individuals than to creditors’ interests in the information, 
one court characterized the interests as follows in rejecting a privilege to 
defame: 
If, therefore, it be immoral to spy and pry into the habits 
and business of another, and to make false statements 
                                                 
272 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882, 883-86 (8th Cir. 1965); 
Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1947); Moore v. Beneficial 
Nat’l Bank USA, 876 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Robinson, 345 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Ark. 1961); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct. 
App. 1975); Lomas Bank USA v. Flatow, 880 S.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); see also 
Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and 
Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1361-61 (1975) (describing the 
development of qualified privileges). 
273 See supra text accompanying notes 257-70. 
274 See, e.g., McDowell v. Credit Bureaus of Southeast Mo., Inc., 747 S.W.2d 630, 631-32 
(Mo. 1998) (agency that had falsely reported that plaintiffs, operators of a home 
construction business, had filed for bankruptcy were entitled to qualified privilege in libel 
action brought against it).  California has codified the common law privilege at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 47(c)(3). 
275 HENDRICKS, supra note 39, at 177-79. 
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about his character and business respectability, it is also 
illegal by our statute law.  If one makes it his business to 
pry into the affairs of another in order to coin money for 
his investigations and information, he must see to it that 
he communicate nothing that is false.  The falsehood of 
the communication, in print or in writing, maligning in 
effect the private character and mercantile standing, is 
itself evidence of malice, legal malice; and unless it be 
strictly a privileged communication in the performance 
of a public duty, or a private duty, moral or legal, and 
then bona fide and not “as a cloak for private malice” the 
right of action and redress by damages are the remedies 
of the injured.276 
Another court rejected the privilege not on the basis of morality, but 
on more practical grounds.  In Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the 
defendant, a credit reporting agency, had misattributed two lawsuits 
that had been filed against a “David Hood” to the plaintiff, who had the 
same name.277  The Fifth Circuit, interpreting Georgia law, rejected the 
agency’s assertion of privilege, relying in part on an empirical study that 
found no difference in the credit availability in a jurisdiction denying the 
privilege to one that did.278 
Florida once recognized such a privilege, but one state court of 
appeals decided to abolish it.279  Idaho has also refused to recognize such 
                                                 
276 Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172, 175 (1886) (internal citation omitted).  The 
Georgia Supreme Court later emphatically rejected an opportunity to adopt a qualified 
privilege for credit reporting agencies: 
We cannot agree to this weighting of the scales against the individual 
who stands alone facing a commercial Goliath with the power to 
destroy-not necessarily through malice but perhaps merely from 
carelessness-his credit rating, commercial advantages, insurance 
protection and employment, all through the publication of erroneous 
reports concerning his affairs. 
Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 234 Ga. 765, 770, 218 S.E.2d 54, 58 (1975). 
277 486 F.2d 25, 27 (5th Cir. 1973).  The court rejected the agency’s argument that credit 
reports are of general and public interest, stating that “Irresistible logic and the absence of 
empirical verification compel this court to conclude that the privilege should not be blindly 
applied to credit reporting agencies in this case.”  Id. at 32. 
278 Id. 
279 Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 259 So. 2d 768, 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).  That 
court reasoned as follows: 
Times change and principles of law change with them.  “A man’s 
credit in this day and age is one of his most valuable assets and 
without it, a substantial portion of the American people would be 
without their homes, washing machines, refrigerators, automobiles, 
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a privilege, understanding the natural consequences it would have:  “If a 
mercantile agency can safely make false reports about the financial 
standing and credit of the citizen and destroy his business, it can then 
take the next step with equal impunity and destroy his reputation, 
leaving him shorn and helpless.”280  A Massachusetts decision reasoned 
that a reasonable limit on the privilege is justified because “There is no 
social utility in reports that are made recklessly or without reasonable 
grounds.  The injury to the subject of the report can be great and the 
person receiving the report gains nothing.”281 
While these decisions make strong policy arguments against such a 
privilege, as discussed above, Congress incorporated the privilege into 
the FCRA.282  Accordingly, if the damage done to an individual’s 
reputation and dignity arises from a report that falls within the FCRA, 
the Act will require the individual to show malice or willful intent in 
order to pursue a cause of action for defamation, even if state law would 
not accord such latitude to the aggregator.283  In fact, even where the 
Act’s qualified immunity provision does not apply, the individual will 
likely have to overcome the common law privilege accorded to 
aggregators, which also generally requires a heightened standard of 
misconduct.284   
Malice, as used in the FCRA and in cases interpreting the qualified 
privilege,285 does not mean moral malice, as in a desire to harm others.286  
                                                                                                             
television sets, and other mechanical paraphernalia that are now 
regarded as necessities of life.”  The impersonal and unconcerned 
attitude displayed by business machines as to the impact of their 
actions upon an individual consumer as here reflected was the catalyst 
for our National Congress to pass the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which 
provides protection for consumers from irresponsible credit reporting 
agencies. 
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
280 Pac. Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 139 P. 1007, 1010 (Idaho 1914); see also W. Union 
Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, 108 Ga. 411, 34 S.E. 216, 216-17 (Ga. 1899) (rejecting privilege, 
distinguishing cooperative exchanges of information from mercantile agencies, who make 
a pecuniary use of the information). 
281 In re Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Mass. 1961) (holding that 
mercantile agency lost privilege where it issued two inconsistent reports and where 
significant derogatory information was “susceptible of precise check”). 
282 See supra Parts III.B.1-B.2. 
283 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (2000). 
284 See supra Part III.B.3. 
285 See supra text accompanying notes 251-70. 
286 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 1965) (common 
law privilege); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 345 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Ark. 1961) (common 
law privilege); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85-87 (Ct. App. 1975) 
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Rather, statutory and common law malice mean acting “with knowledge 
that [the information] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not.”287  Malice has also been defined as making a report 
without reasonable grounds to do so.288  A few courts have even 
constrained the definition of “reckless disregard” to require the plaintiff 
to show that “‘the speaker entertained actual doubt about the truth of the 
statement.’”289  
2. The Relationship Between the Standard of Malice and Data 
Technology 
The standard of malice should flex to reflect modern database 
technology, data aggregators’ awareness of errors of misattribution, and 
the power of information and misinformation over individuals.  
Practices that may have failed to reach the standard before modern 
information technology developed might well surpass the standard now.  
That technology allows us to pull up and compare different pieces of 
information as if they were books on a desk.  The failure to examine 
records over which one has complete control can meet the standard of 
malice.290  It is, in fact, even easier to compare data in a database than to 
find, for example, conflicting passages between two pieces of printed 
text—the digital form of the information allows it to be pinpointed 
immediately. 
Doubt should arise where data providers are aware of a tendency to 
undermatch their transactions to the individuals actually making them 
or when aggregators are aware that the matching algorithms they use are 
likely to mismatch some records to the wrong individuals, even if for 
any single report the aggregator does not entertain doubt as to that 
specific report.  That doubt should arise from the knowledge of the rate 
                                                                                                             
(common law privilege); Myshrall v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 802 A.2d 419, 424-25 (Me. 2002); 
see also Dalton v. Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 418 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(interpreting FCRA’s punitive damages provision, which requires the plaintiff to show the 
actor acted willfully). 
287 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
288 In re Petition of Retailers Comm. Agency, Inc., 174 N.E.2d 376, 380 (Mass. 1961) 
(reversing judgment against agency on grounds that agency did not lose privilege through 
mere negligence). 
289 Moore v. Equifax Info. Servs. L.L.C., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 2004) 
(citation omitted); see, e.g., Whelan v. Trans Union Credit Reporting Agency, 862 F. Supp. 
824, 833 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan); Lomas Bank USA v. Flatow, 
880 S.W.2d 52, 53-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). 
290 See Interstate Transit Lines v. Crane, 100 F.2d 857, 860-62 (10th Cir. 1938) (ruling that 
employee overcame qualified privilege of employer by showing “indifference” to the 
employee’s interests, and affirming judgment of libel against defendant). 
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of inaccuracies and by the complaints made to data providers and 
aggregators by defamed consumers.291  Furthermore, the rising risks of 
identity theft—just one form of mismatching—have not been unnoticed 
by the agencies or, for that matter, by Congress.292  At least one court has 
identified the rise in identity theft as sufficient on its own to raise the 
standard of care that aggregators should use and,293 as noted above, the 
FTC received more than 240,000 complaints of identity theft in 2003.294  
The awareness of that risk is particularly visible in the new products that 
agencies and providers offer and the demand for those products.295  In 
the old world of paper records, it would have been reckless for an 
agency to report a negative item, such as a lawsuit, as being the 
responsibility of a particular individual when an employee had, sitting 
on his desk, identifying information that conflicted with that in the item.  
These databases essentially put all of their information at the fingertips 
of those who provide and aggregate it.  Furthermore, these parties know 
well the power of information; it is what supports the industry.  
Accordingly, what might not have been reckless treatment of 
information many years ago may well rise (or fall) to that standard in the 
present day, given the ability of data aggregators and providers to 
aggregate and analyze the data in their warehouses and the power that 
data has over the lives of individuals. 
Other torts adapt to fit advances in knowledge and technology; 
defamation can as well.  For example, a medical malpractice action can 
arise from a doctor’s failure to use a current standard of care, including 
advances in medical technology, rather than the standard of care 
appropriate in past generations.296  Similarly, behavior that may not have 
once arisen to reckless disregard of the truth can now meet that 
standard. 
                                                 
291 See MISTAKES DO HAPPEN, supra note 62, at 4. 
292 See, e.g., Securing Electronic Personal Data: Striking a Balance Between Privacy and 
Commercial and Governmental Use, Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Apr. 
13, 2005). 
293 Graham v. CSC Credit Servs., 306 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (D. Minn. 2004); see supra text 
accompanying notes 126, 184. 
294 See supra note 73 (citing FTC Releases Top 10 Consumer Complaint Categories for 2004, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/02/top102005.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007)). 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 28-60. 
296 See JOHN J. ELWELL, A MEDICO-LEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRACTICE AND MEDICAL 
EVIDENCE, COMPRISING THE ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 54-56 (1860); see also John 
C. Drapp III, Comment, The National Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice Actions: Does 
Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 95, 100-01 
(2003) (discussing evolution from “the strict locality standard” that was based on the 
inability of rural physicians to keep up with advances in the profession, as technological 
advances allowed physicians to learn of such advances). 
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3. Modern Analog Interpretations of Malice 
Although malice should not require intentional wrongdoing, some 
decisions have deferred so far to aggregators and providers that they 
have inadequately considered whether evidence of some lower level of 
mishandling should lift the FCRA’s qualified immunity provision.  
Interpreting “recklessness” to cover behavior such as ascribing an act to 
an individual when the ascriber’s own data system has conflicting 
information, publishing information from a source the publisher knows 
to have been inaccurate previously, or failing to counter the fraud 
running rampant in the consumer data industry does not expand the 
original concept of appropriate liability, but rather enforces it.297  Courts 
need to apply the recklessness standard in light of modern digital 
technology, rather than of older, analog processes. 
For example, a report should not logically include an account 
opened before the target individual had even been born.  In one case, the 
defendant acknowledged that it used fuzzy matching to assemble credit 
reports and did not check the accuracy on records whose identity 
markers did not quite match the target’s.298  Had the defendant done so, 
it would perhaps have realized before issuing the report that the record 
of a bankruptcy by one company whose name was similar to the 
plaintiff’s could not have been the plaintiff’s because the plaintiff’s 
incorporation date, the institutional equivalent of a birth date, showed 
that it did not exist at the time of the bankruptcy.299  Nonetheless, the 
court concluded that the agency’s deliberate use of fuzzy matching was 
not reckless and dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim.300  In fact, it 
was not reckless; it was intentional. 
Similarly, another court dismissed a defamation claim where a 
consumer reporting agency had merged records belonging to the 
plaintiff’s son and daughter-in-law into plaintiff’s credit report, even 
though the records did not match the plaintiff’s social security number, 
address, or date of birth, and even though the agency continued to 
misattribute some of the son’s accounts to his father after the father 
alerted the agency of the errors and provided the agency with his own 
                                                 
297 See, e.g., Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir. 1973). 
298 County Vanlines, Inc. v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 383, 388 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
299 Id. at 386. 
300 Id. at 389. 
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accurate identifying information.301  Another court found that a creditor 
did not act recklessly in reporting a loan that the creditor had extended 
to an identity thief as being the responsibility of one of the plaintiffs, 
even though the identifying documents used by the thief conflicted in 
several ways with the data in the plaintiff’s credit report, including the 
date of birth and work history.302 
These internal conflicts in information within an agency or 
furnisher’s ownership should raise doubts as to accuracy before it is ever 
attributed to any particular person.  However, even should overlooking 
a conflict fail to be reckless at that point, serious doubts as to accuracy 
should arise once a consumer notifies an aggregator or a furnisher that a 
debt reported in the consumer’s name is not his.  Although a certain 
percentage of such disputes may be weak attempts to avoid answering 
for a legitimate debt, the risk that some disputes may be valid should 
trigger in the reporting figure sufficient doubt to look for additional 
indicia of accuracy.  Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit, in Morris v. Equifax 
Information Services, L.L.C.,303 held that an agency did not act recklessly in 
continuing to falsely report a debt as belonging to the plaintiff, even 
though the plaintiff had notified the agency of his dispute and yet, 
according to the plaintiff, the agency “continued to publish the same 
false information about [the plaintiff] without lifting a finger to 
determine whether the information was false or not.”304  According to 
the court, the consumer’s notification did not “present ‘sufficient 
evidence . . . that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of [its] publication.’”305  If serious doubts do not arise from the 
conflicts within the agency’s or creditor’s own system or from a 
consumer’s direct challenge to the information, then the malice standard 
becomes nearly unattainable 
One judge, who reluctantly allowed a claim to go forward, 
questioned why a business would have been motivated to create false 
accounts upon the application of an identity thief, accounts that the 
business could expect would be difficult to collect.306  However, the 
                                                 
301 O’Connor v. Trans Union Corp., No. 97-4633, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14917, at **2-3, 
**21-23 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 1999). 
302 Aklagi v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1196 (D. Kan. 2002). 
303 457 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment). 
304 Id. at 471. 
305 Id. (emphasis & citation omitted). 
306 Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (continuing to 
report accounts after learning of mismatching error could demonstrate the willfulness 
necessary for punitive damages under the Act). 
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court’s question reveals a number of misunderstandings about the role 
of information in the digital world.  First, the question should not be 
whether the merchant intended to create a fraudulent account.  The 
plaintiff should not have to show, in order to claim defamation, that the 
merchant intended, at the time it opened the account, to open it in the 
name of someone who had not applied for it.  For purposes of showing 
malice, the question should be, when the merchant reported the 
account’s delinquency to the data aggregators, whether that merchant 
has serious doubts as to whether the identity of the person that the 
business designated as responsible for the account actually is, in fact, the 
person who had opened it.  Such doubts could, and should, arise from 
any mismatch between the identity markers in a credit report the 
business sought at the time the account was opened, such as date of 
birth, place of birth, or social security number, and those on the 
application for service.  Such doubts could also arise from past 
experiences with misattribution, from internal fraud-prevention reviews 
and procedures, or from other revelations of risk.  Furthermore, surely 
such doubts arise when the misidentified individual notifies the business 
of its error and provides substantiating identifying information, such as 
date of birth or address, that distinguishes that individual from the 
account opener.  Continuing to attribute the account to that individual 
after such events should be considered reckless, thereby malicious, and 
thus grounds for a defamation action. 
Second, the statement ignores that the faulty account is just one in 
thousands.  While a business may not intend to open any one particular 
account for an impostor, it may well not mind the risk of opening some 
accounts without sufficiently verifying the applicant’s identity if the 
business perceives the costs of absorbing those losses as reasonable in 
light of other profits.  One assessment of those losses includes the 
relatively small chance that they will have to pay significant damages to 
the person to whom they wrongly attributed the information.  That 
chance is artificially small because of the burden imposed on individuals 
to demonstrate recklessness and because of the shield that the FCRA’s 
dated interpretations of the Act’s accuracy and immunity provisions 
grant them. 
Finally, the judge’s statement above that a business would not be 
motivated to create an account in the name of someone who did not 
open it also assumes that someone who does not owe a debt will not pay 
it, which overlooks the power of negative financial information in the 
information age.  Given the impact a delinquent account may have on an 
individual and the relatively weak ability of individuals to clear falsely 
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attributed data, a business may be able to count on strong-arming the 
individual to pay the debt incurred by another, profiting off of the 
consumer’s need to proceed with his or her transactional life. 
The decision portrays a rigid conception of malice, a conception that 
soldiers on, impervious to changes in technology, uses of that technology 
by merchants and data aggregators, and the power of information.  
Curtailing the standard this way allows aggregators all the benefit of 
advancing technology with no responsibility to use it for the benefit of 
the individuals on whom they report. 
In contrast, where an aggregator’s employee, as opposed to its 
machine, has records that clearly identify two separate people, reporting 
one person’s record as the other can show reckless disregard for the 
truth, clearing the Act’s qualified immunity malice hurdle.307  In Wiggins 
v. Equifax Services, the plaintiff’s employer fired him after a background 
check service reported that he had a felony conviction on his record. 308  
The employer had provided the service with the plaintiff’s first name, 
last name, middle initial, date of birth, social security number, and 
address.309  The service’s employee located a felony conviction record of 
someone with the same first and last names, but a different middle initial 
and date of birth, and reported that conviction as the plaintiff’s.310  The 
court refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation claim against the 
service, finding that issuing a report before verifying the conviction 
could meet the reckless disregard standard.311  Implicitly, the court 
found fuzzy matching to be an unreasonable data aggregation technique, 
at least where a human being observes a conflict between the identity 
markers in the record and those of the target. 
By viewing recklessness in light of computers’ abilities to 
consistently and mechanistically compare data, the risk of liability for 
defaming an individual would rise.  That risk could, and hopefully 
would, motivate data aggregators to use their information technology to 
cleanse gossip and rumor from their systems. 
                                                 
307 See Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., 848 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D.D.C. 1993). 
308 Id. at 217. 
309 Id. at 216. 
310 Id. at 217. 
311 Id. at 223. 
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4. Modern Digital Interpretations of the Malice Standard 
Other courts have adjusted to the advances in technology, realizing 
that both data providers and data aggregators should be well aware that 
data may not belong to whom it appears.  Failing to acknowledge that 
risk, by verifying identities of doers of the deeds they report, surpasses 
that standard of recklessness.  One such decision, Graham v. CSC Credit 
Services, Inc., illustrates the frustrations of a consumer in the digital age 
who must cleanse his or her biographical record of someone else’s 
deed.312  In Graham, the plaintiff learned when he applied for a mortgage 
that an identity thief had opened an account with a creditor in the 
plaintiff’s name and that the defendant, a consumer reporting agency, 
had reported the thief’s account as being the plaintiff’s responsibility.313  
The plaintiff disputed the ownership of the debt to the agency and also 
notified the defendant that two addresses listed in the plaintiff’s report—
one of which the creditor had supplied—were wrong.  Although the 
agency did delete the two addresses, it insisted that the fraudulent 
account was the plaintiff’s, having sent an automated dispute resolution 
form to the data provider and supposedly receiving an automated 
response that verified the account.314  The agency only deleted the 
misattributed account when the plaintiff insisted on challenging it for a 
second time.315 
This sort of problem might be far rarer if agencies stored not just 
new items of information, but the sources of that information.  Recording 
sources would reveal information about the item’s reliability and could 
indicate identity theft.  In reviewing the plaintiff’s claim that the agency 
had not only violated the FCRA, but had done so willfully, the Graham 
court castigated the agency for designing its database so as not to record 
the source of data and emphasized that the substantive standard of 
reasonableness under the Act moves with advances in technology.316 
Agencies, the court stated, “have a duty to update their systems to 
continue to strive for accuracy” in the face of “new dangers, such as 
identity theft.”317  The court noted the FTC’s report that millions of 
                                                 
312 306 F. Supp. 2d 873, 881 (D. Minn. 2004). 
313 Id. at 876 n.1. 
314 Id.  The agency insisted that the creditor verified the debt electronically, but the 
creditor disagreed, stating that it had a note in its files that the account might be 
fraudulent.  Id. 
315 Id. at 877. 
316 Id. at 883. 
317 Id. at 881 n.1. 
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Americans had been victims of identity theft in the recent past.318  Thus, 
changes in technology and in information use “change the definition” of 
what is reasonable.319  The court held that the agency’s “intentional 
policy decision” to avoid structuring its system to lower the risk of 
misattributed data could justify punitive damages under the FCRA.320  
Other courts have also reasoned that to knowingly mismatch or 
undermatch records can be reckless.  For example, in McMillan v. 
Experian, a furnisher reported the account of a son as being that of his 
father, who had the same name, even after the father challenged it and 
even though the two had different dates of birth, addresses, phone 
numbers, and employment addresses.321  The court ruled that such 
undermatching could show reckless disregard for the truth and denied 
the furnisher’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s 
defamation claim.322  Similarly, in Stevenson v. Employers Mutual Ass’n, an 
employee was suspended from his job after the defendant, who was 
hired to do background checks, reported that he was a three-time 
convicted felon after matching the convictions to another by the same 
name.323  The court ruled that the defendant’s failure to check its match 
by examining a physical description of the criminal or by comparing the 
plaintiff’s work record to the criminal’s times of imprisonment could be 
sufficiently reckless to pass the FCRA’s malice hurdle, and it denied the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s libel claim.324  
Even if the original mismatching of a record to an individual is not 
reckless, once the individual contacts an aggregator or provider about 
the error, that aggregator’s next report of the record should meet the 
recklessness standard and amount to malice.325  So, for example, if a 
business opens an account upon an identity thief’s application, the 
individual to whom the data provider attributes the debt should be able 
to show malice if the provider continued to report the account in the 
                                                 
318 Id. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 881.  That is, that the policy decision could constitute a willful violation of the 
Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2000).  Some decisions equate willfulness with malice.  See, e.g., 
Crane v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 282 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
321 170 F. Supp. 2d 278, 282 (D. Conn. 2001). 
322 Id. at 287. 
323 960 F. Supp. 141, 142 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
324 Id. 
325 See, e.g., Weir v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., 435 S.E.2d 864, 867 (S.C. 1993) (affirming trial 
court’s denial of data provider’s motion for a directed verdict where plaintiff showed that 
he had contacted the provider about the account several times yet the provider continued 
to report the account as his, and stating that the jury could infer malice from such conduct). 
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individual’s name, even after the individual has notified the provider of 
the theft.326 
Neither of the Seventh Circuit mismatching cases discussed earlier, 
in relation to the FCRA’s standards, involved defamation claims, and 
accordingly they did not analyze malice.327  However, had those 
decisions used the interpretation advocated here, that aggregators are 
reckless when they misattribute a transaction to an individual 
notwithstanding that they have learned that their own databases clearly 
reveal irresolvable inconsistencies, both plaintiffs would have been able 
to recover for the damage done to their reputations.  In Crabill, where the 
agency wrongly attributed to the plaintiff information belonging to the 
plaintiff’s brother, the attribution was reckless because the identifying 
information of name, social security number, and date of birth of the two 
brothers were in such clear conflict.328  Once the plaintiff notified the 
agency of the error and specifically requested that the agency put “‘do 
not confuse with brother John D. Crabill’” in every report, the agency’s 
continued misattributions surpassed recklessness, arguably rising to 
intentional.329  In Sarver, where the aggregator, a consumer reporting 
agency, attributed accounts that indicated the borrower’s bankruptcy to 
the wrong individual, the agency acted recklessly at the latest when it 
repeated the misattribution, even after the plaintiff had notified the 
agency of its error.330 
In sum, many present day information practices are reckless, and 
defamation liability likely should arise.  The limitations on lawsuits for 
the false imputation of one doer’s event to another should reflect the 
realities of current or even recently obsolete information technology.  As 
discussed above, the problem of misattributing a particular event to the 
wrong doer is a problem of mismatching identity.  If we think of identity 
as comprising a collection of Goffman’s identity pegs, the increase in the 
volume of recorded transactions increases the risk that using just one 
peg—for example a social security number—will mismatch the record to 
the wrong person.  When identity pegs are made fuzzy by identification 
                                                 
326 See, e.g., Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922-23 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(continuing to report accounts after learning of mismatching error could demonstrate the 
willfulness necessary for punitive damages under the Act); Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 
848 F. Supp. 213, 223 (D.D.C. 1993) (where an employee of the agency knew that the target 
of the report had a different middle name and date of birth from that on derogatory record, 
malice requirement could be met, denying agency’s motion for summary judgment). 
327 See supra text accompanying notes 208-33. 
328 259 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2000). 
329 Id. 
330 390 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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algorithms that deliberately undermatch those pegs, the risk becomes 
even higher.  However, technology can help identify matching errors by 
checking for anomalies and, when one arises, verifying additional 
identity pegs to drop the risk of misattribution.  Once aware of a risk of 
misattribution, failing to use information over which one has complete 
possession and control to maximize accuracy is every bit as reckless 
under the malice standard as if the contradiction were apparent from the 
face of two pieces of paper, as in Wiggins v. Equifax Services,331 instead of 
from two different digital records. 
An updated understanding of recklessness, for purposes of tort 
liability, for mismatching of data could also expand the protections of the 
FCRA.  A practice that was reckless for purposes of defamation law 
should fail the FCRA’s demand that data aggregators use “reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”332 and to reasonably 
reinvestigate disputes,333 surely unreasonable for purposes of the FCRA. 
Recognizing the culpability of the participants in the data market by 
characterizing these practices as reckless is justified by several 
circumstances.  First, the problem of misattribution is well known to the 
data market participants.  The volume of consumers’ disputes to 
agencies and of complaints to the FTC has given them notice of the flaws 
in their data verification practices.  Other justifying circumstances are 
discussed below. 
B. Reinterpretation Will Promote Dignity, Personhood, and Liberty 
The computer age, the Internet, and the development of information 
technology have provided people with immense power to impact the 
social identity of individuals; such power should bring with it inherent 
responsibility that has not yet been adopted or imposed.  As discussed 
above, by interpreting “recklessness” in light of the immense capacity of 
modern data technology to analyze and verify data, the common law can 
provide defamed consumers with an avenue for redress.  More 
importantly, raising a specter of liability for initial false reports would 
motivate data providers and aggregators to ensure the integrity of data 
and reports, which would keep false information from falling into the 
pool of data, from which it is so very hard, maybe impossible, to fully 
and thoroughly retrieve it.   
                                                 
331 Wiggins, 848 F. Supp. at 223. 
332 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 184-85. 
333 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a); see also supra text accompanying notes 184-85. 
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Right now, the FCRA and outdated interpretations of its qualified 
immunity from defamation and of the common law’s own privilege have 
allowed data providers, aggregators, and miners to benefit from the 
technology that allows them to pull, cull, and analyze immense amounts 
of data while at the same time receiving protection from interpretations 
of law that overlook the mastery those aggregators have, or should have, 
over the data they warehouse.  This robs consumers of dignity and 
personhood by presenting these distorted virtual images as themselves 
and exposes them to a higher risk of being deemed financially unfit, 
while maximizing the impact of false information.  Existing 
interpretations effectively allow them to defame until forced to stop. 
Primary protection of reputation, personality, and dignity require 
preventing the injury to begin with.  Tort law has always had the motive 
of preventing injury, and defamation is the age-old tool to protect these 
interests.  In contrast, federal statutory law, like the FCRA, has not 
traditionally protected personhood.  As used and interpreted, it does not 
prevent injury to personality or reputation, but provides a rather 
haphazard system of remedies and non-remedies for those who have 
been injured by the false attribution of a negative act. 
Roscoe Pound argued that the right to one’s personality develops 
logically from a Kantian formula of justice that is confirmed by showing 
that in the evolution of society the right has been increasingly 
recognized.334  The protection of personality passes the test of whether it 
promotes “the general, the public, organization and order, . . . in such a 
way as to equalize opportunity for all.”335 
Defamation is the method by which society protects dignity, which 
Robert Post characterizes as the “respect (and self-respect) that arises 
from full membership in society.”336  The law of defamation enforces 
“society’s interest[s] in its rules of civility.”337  Furthermore, in contrast to 
the FCRA, where few decisions have found meaningful liability for the 
initial report of false information, the common law of defamation can 
impose liability for the original reporting of false information. 
Defamation not only serves to protect dignity, it protects that aspect 
of the right to personality that allows individuals control over how their 
image is portrayed to the rest of the world.  Our capacity to remain 
                                                 
334 Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 351-52 (1915). 
335 Id. at 347 (quoting JOHN DEWEY & JAMES TUFTS, ETHICS 482-83 (1908)). 
336 Post, supra note 160, at 711. 
337 Id. 
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independent from external forces or stimuli is threatened by the 
irresponsible use of detached data.  With the loss of control, an 
individual loses the ability to determine the image seen by others and the 
reputation portrayed to others.  Daniel Solove, in arguing for privacy 
protections, argues that they are needed because “concerns about being 
misjudged and having one’s reputations poisoned can make people 
profoundly unfree, shackling them to their perceptions of how they will 
be perceived.”338 
That loss of control can, in turn, drive one to internalize the false 
image.339  Steven Heyman argues that a person who is denied the right to 
self-determination is denied liberty.340  As he notes, the right to 
personality entitles one to determine “one’s own inner life without 
wrongful interference” from others.341  False data interferes with this 
right.342   
While defamation and invasion of privacy torts such as false light 
protect the damage to individuals, routine dissemination of bad data can 
damage dignity in a systemic way, beyond the injury to an individual’s 
“inviolate personality.”343  Lies do not contribute to the “democratic 
dialogue,” but rather “distort[ ] the collective search for truth.”344  One 
scholar has even insisted that defamation law “is as essential to the 
health of the [country] and the press as it is to the victims of 
                                                 
338 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1040 (2003). 
339 See Heyman, supra note 16. 
Thus there is a certain unity between the self and its image, just as 
there was between the self and the body in the sphere of external 
rights.  Moreover, the self asserts a claim to its image, for it is only 
through this image that it is capable of interacting with others and thus 
fully realizing itself.  It follows that one has a right to one’s image, 
including one’s reputation.  This right has two elements. Negatively, it 
consists in a right not to have actions or characteristics falsely imputed 
to oneself.  Positively, it is the right not to be deprived of the image 
that one has legitimately acquired through interaction with others. 
Id. at 1338. 
340 Id. at 1314. 
341 Id. at 1325.  Heyman’s thesis is that the rights to self-determination and one’s 
personality justifies certain limits on First Amendment freedoms that interfere with such 
natural rights.  Id. at 1279, 1333. 
342 Id. at 1333-34.  Heyman compares defamation to battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, in terms of the injuries inflicted.  Id. 
343 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 
(1890) (arguing for a new tort to protect individuals’ privacy). 
344 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 951 (1968). 
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defamation.”345  Justice White, in his dissent from the majority opinion in 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,346 argued that state libel laws arose to protect 
the “essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the 
root of any decent system of ordered liberty” and that such laws were 
necessary for the continued existence of our political system.347  In order 
to be able to achieve that protection, given data aggregation and the 
“frothy Chaos” of errors,348 defamation and false light torts should be 
interpreted consistently with the capabilities of those who create, report, 
and distribute consumer information and with the power of such 
information to harm individuals.   
Furthermore, it is not just the defamed individual who suffers from 
data pollution; those who rely on that data to make decisions also are 
harmed.  A polluted sea of data will lead to poor business decisions—for 
example, an employer could lose out on a valuable and profitable 
employee or a lender could lose out on a trustworthy borrower.  If such 
entities are suffering, then one might reasonably ask why do they not 
assert their own claims against data aggregators.  Perhaps it is because 
the damage suffered when one deal is lost is slight compared to the total 
numbers. 
One criticism of common law is that it is too reactive and too gradual 
in its change to effectively protect against the misuse of information 
technology.349  A similar criticism of tort law is that it is intended to 
remedy isolated, individual wrongs, as opposed to systemic problems.350  
Such an approach is “reactive”351 and treated as a matter of individual 
                                                 
345 David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 490 (1991). 
346 418 U.S. 323, 402 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).  The majority held that “so long as they 
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate 
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a 
private individual.”  Id. at 347. 
347 Id. at 341.  Justice White reasoned that while civilized society may justify some 
exposure of individuals’ lives, those individuals do “not bargain for defamatory 
falsehoods.”  Id. at 402; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene 
Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1564 (2000). 
348 Montaigne, supra note 2. 
349 Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 
2029, 2033 (2001). 
350 Solove, Enforcing Privacy Rights, supra note 37, at 1232-33.  Solove notes the problem of 
aggregation—how one individual piece of information may not in and of itself be 
sensitively revealing, but when aggregated with many other such pieces can form what he 
calls a “‘digital biography’” of a person that can form a whole that is greater than the sum 
of the parts.  Id. at 1233.  Thus, with aggregation we have “the growing use and 
dissemination of personal information creat[ing] a Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy . . . .”  
Id. at 1234. 
351 Id. at 1231. 
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entitlement.352  However, providing individuals with even one effective 
tool with which to repair damaged reputations could motivate those in 
the consumer data industry to curb undermatching and fuzzy matching 
of data.  Just as the aggregation of different points of personal 
information can be larger than the sum of the points, perhaps the 
aggregation of individual torts can also have a systemic impact. 
Law and economics arguments that privacy is inefficient because it 
promotes fraud and hampers the exchange of information do not apply 
where the information is false, and, in fact, privacy would help cleanse 
the market of fraudulent information.353  Nonetheless, defamation law by 
itself will not cure all the problems consumers have with others’ acts 
stuck to their identities, a solution to what Lawrence Lessig calls “the 
failure of the information market.”354 
One concern is that rigid matching procedures would cause 
aggregators to fail to link a doer’s deed to the doer, an inaccuracy of a 
different sort.  For example, requiring a name to match exactly might 
exclude those records where an individual omitted a middle initial, or 
where a clerk mistyped a social security number.  However, the damage 
done to individuals whose histories are blackened by another’s acts 
should outweigh the smaller harm that the biography a user receives is 
incomplete.  The misery of repairing an inaccurate history extends across 
months and costs victims time, money, and dignity.355  
The importance of attributing events correctly has risen with the 
increased use of credit scores.  Users themselves may not access the 
whole biography to make their own independent assessment of the 
credibility of each record.  The use of credit scores means that users—the 
credit card companies, the mortgage lenders, the department stores—
may well receive only a number produced by the underlying 
information.356  Thus, that user may not even be able to alert a consumer 
                                                 
352 Id. 
353 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 532-37 (1995); see also Richard S. Murphy, 
Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 
(1996) (arguing that substantial economic benefits may derive from privacy rights). 
354 Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063, 2071 (2001). 
355 One study of 197 identity theft victims revealed that the average time spent by victims 
to clear their records was 330 hours and that many lost thousands of dollars in lost wages 
and spent hundreds in out-of-pocket expenses.  Identity Theft Resource Center, Identity 
Theft: The Aftermath 2004 13 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ 
aftermath2004.pdf.  The victims surveyed reported significant emotional impact from the 
crime that resembled symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.  Id. at 20-21. 
356 See supra text accompanying notes 114-54. 
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as to the particular record attributed to the consumer that lowered the 
number in a way that costs the plaintiff an opportunity for a loan or a 
lower interest rate.  The increased automation of credit checks has 
masked the individual items. 
In addition to benefiting individuals, a standard that imposed 
liability for reckless mismatching of records would enhance the integrity 
of the pool of aggregatable data as a whole.  At present, we have a 
system that not only fails to promote accurate matching, but may in fact 
discourage those who create data from sufficiently fixing the identity of 
the doer and assigning sufficient identity markers to the record to keep it 
stuck to that individual, making sure it would not be prone to attaching 
to the identity of another.  These practices could retard the 
improvements that data matching technology offers to both those who 
use data and those whose data is used. 
C. The Feasibility of Meeting the Standard 
The technology that could improve the accuracy and integrity of 
personal information already exists.  To maintain the shield of the 
qualified privilege that defamation accords data aggregators, they 
should be required to use that technology to verify that a negative record 
does not bear identity markers that are insufficient to pin that item to a 
particular consumer, or that the item’s identity markers do not differ in 
meaningful ways from those of the target consumer.  That businesses 
and data aggregators are aware of the risks to consumers of mismatching 
records and that they have the ability to match deeds more exactingly to 
their doer’s identity is shown by the very products that they create and 
market.  They can require matching of more identity markers to avoid 
the misattribution errors that arise from undermatching.  For example, 
Experian, on its home page, notifies readers of the risks of identity 
theft.357  It advertises a product called “Credit Manager” that notifies a 
consumer by email of “important changes” to a consumer’s report.358  
Given that, as discussed above, the agencies do not keep individual files 
on consumers, but rather gather information on the fly when requested 
by sending the algorithm trolling through the databases, the product 
indicates that they are able to seek new information automatically.359  
Trans Union offers a credit monitoring service called True Credit that 
also sends email notices of changes within 24 hours, and it offers identity 
                                                 
357 Experian Home Page, http://www.experian.com (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
358 Credit Manager Home Page, https://www.creditexpert.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 
2007). 
359 See supra text accompanying notes 37-93. 
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theft insurance and fraud resolution services as well.360  Equifax warns 
consumers that it could take up to two years to clear your name if you’re 
a victim of identity theft and offers a product called Credit Watch Gold 
to help consumers prevent the agency from reporting a thief’s debts in 
their names.361  The fear of being the target of misattributed information 
has helped the data aggregator, Equifax, take in record revenue in 
2004.362  Its personal solutions business, where it sells its identity theft 
prevention products, rose dramatically as well.363   
This sort of “supermatch,” if done routinely, could be used to weed 
out information not meeting the supermatch standard, which would 
help improve the accuracy of the snapshot of each consumer’s financial 
image.  Furthermore, credit scoring algorithms have already been 
developed that purport to be able to verify identities by matching 
identity markers.364  Such feasibility exists outside the traditional credit 
reporting industry in the modern data aggregation market as well.  One 
of the leading data aggregators, ChoicePoint, even verifies the range of 
the issue date for a given person’s social security number against the 
associated date of birth.365 
The products offered show that these data aggregators are highly 
aware of the prevalence of identity theft and that they have the analytical 
capacity to discern unusual activity in a particular consumer’s name, at 
least if the consumer is willing to pay for it.  Another product, offered by 
Equifax, indicates that furnishers should be able to verify the identities of 
those with whom they do business, which would help them reduce 
mistranscription errors.  Equifax offers businesses the automated ability 
to “[q]uickly and easily authenticate identities online.”366 
                                                 
360 True Credit Home Page, http://www.truecredit.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
361 Equifax Personal Solutions Home Page, https://www.econsumer.equifax.co.uk/ 
consumer/uk/sitepage.ehtml?forward=gb_esn_detail (last visited Jan. 13, 2007); see also 
Credit Watch Gold Home Page, https://www.econsumer.equifax.com/consumer/ 
sitepage.ehtml?forward=esn_detail. (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
362 Ann McDonald, Market Watch: Equifax’s Stock Soars (2006), http://www.credit 
collectionsworld.com/cgi-bin/readstory2.pl?story=20050801CCRQ313.xml. 
363 Id. 
364 Ann McDonald, High Points for Credit Scoring, http://www.creditcollectionsworld. 
com/cg-bin/readstring.pl?story=20050401CCR0247.xml (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).  Each of 
the big three credit reporting agencies, Trans Union, Experian, and Equifax, uses scoring 
algorithms to prevent fraud, target collection efforts, and assess risk.  Id. 
365 CHOICEPOINT, PROCHECK: CHOICEPOINT AUTHENTICATION SOLUTIONS 2 (2005), 
http://www.choicepoint.com/authentication/common/pdfs/ProCheck.pdf. 
366 Equifax Business Solutions Home Page, www.equifax.com/biz/solutions/fraud. 
shtml (last visited Jan. 13, 2007). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Information about individual transactions that used to just simply 
evaporate at the conclusion of the deal can now be recorded, searched, 
analyzed, and passed around, easily accessible once networked into the 
Internet.  At the same time, we are often so detached from our 
information that a cache of records in a database and not personal 
knowledge determines whether any particular event is attributed to an 
individual.  Because of the volume of transactions and the need to 
identify each transaction with a specific flesh-and-blood person, it has 
become all too easy for a potentially crippling record about a transaction 
to become ascribed to someone other than the original doer. 
Once upon a time, the tort of defamation could provide redress for 
someone falsely accused of being unworthy of credit, and that redress 
likely curbed such accusers.  Later, the FCRA largely supplanted the old 
common law action, at least for those financial transactions that fell 
within its scope.  However, those standards impose meaningful 
requirements on data providers and data aggregators only after an item 
has been wrongly ascribed to an innocent consumer.  Furthermore, the 
Act unreasonably protects data providers and aggregators through its 
provisions that grant those parties qualified immunity from some torts, 
provide unqualified immunity from private suit for many of its accuracy 
standards, and preempt state accuracy standards.  This protection is 
unreasonable because a false attribution may well stick to the consumer 
even after the consumer has used the Act’s provisions to accuse a 
provider or aggregator of failing to ensure accuracy because digital data 
is so easily duplicated and transmitted.  Once accused, a consumer may 
never fully restore the reputation arising from those records. 
Accordingly, while the Act may have been appropriate for analog 
records, which were burdensome to search and highly subject to human 
error.  Now, however, bad data has more power and information 
technology allows those who traffic in data to use computers to analyze, 
verify, and cross-check it.  This mastery over data, in light of the power 
of that data, justifies meaningful liability for mismatching denigrating 
information to an individual when the data provider or aggregator could 
have easily avoided the misattribution.  By acknowledging the power 
providers and aggregators have over the information, the providers’ and 
aggregators’ culpability can rise to the level of recklessness necessary to 
overcome the common law’s qualified privilege and the FCRA’s 
qualified immunity from defamation.  If the risk of liability for initial 
reporting rises, data providers and aggregators could direct information 
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technology to prevent the pollution of the data sea with mismatched 
information from the start. 
Preventing pollution by inaccurate data will help individuals 
maintain the reputations that they have earned through their own deeds, 
rather than the deeds of someone else.  Their transactional biographies 
will reflect their own choices and personalities as expressed through 
those choices.  By curbing the reckless use and abuse of information, the 
common law of defamation can protect the rights of individuals to 
personal dignity by treating them as individuals who make distinct 
choices as opposed to objects who serve the purposes of others. 
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